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INTRODUCTION
1.1 The Long-Term Public Finance Report provides a comprehensive analysis of long-term
economic and demographic developments, and their likely impact on the public finances. It
is intended that the Report will continue to be published on an annual basis in the future.
1.2 The  Government  believes  that  sustainable  public  finances  are  a  prerequisite  to
achieving stable long-term economic growth, which in turn is essential in guaranteeing that
everybody participates in the growing prosperity of the country. The Government also seeks
to ensure that spending and taxation impact fairly between generations.
1.3 One of the key challenges facing the Government is the ageing of the population. This
trend will have profound effects on Britain’s society and economy over the coming decades.
The demand for health care, for example, is likely to rise as a result of the increase in the
number of older people. A good understanding of the challenges which arise is essential for
the Government to make the right long-term strategic policy decisions and to ensure that
government policy will be long-term sustainable.
1.4 The Report aims to provide:
• a comprehensive picture of the sustainability of the public finances over the
long term based on a range of plausible assumptions;
• an indication of the degree of inter-generational fairness; 
• better quality information to guide policy and enhance decision-making and
planning by both the Government and individuals; and
• a framework for examining the effects of demography and other long-term
trends on the public finances.
1.5 The Report confirms earlier studies that the UK fiscal position is sustainable in the long-
term on the basis of current policies and that the UK is in a strong position relative to many
other  developed  countries.  The  Report  also  finds  that  there  is  a  high  degree  of  inter-
generational  fairness;  particularly  so  when  account  is  taken  of  the  increase  in  public
investment that has been announced and which will provide benefits for both current and
future generations.
1.6 Since  coming  to  office  in  1997,  the  Government  has  introduced  a  wide  range  of
measures and publications that have increased transparency, credibility and accountability
in  policy-making  and  implementation.  The  Report complements  existing  publications,
including the Code for Fiscal Stability
1 , Annex A of the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report
(EFSR),  and  further  develops  the  credibility  and  transparency  of  the  fiscal  framework
alongside the End of Year Fiscal Report (EYFR), which is also being published alongside the
Pre-Budget Report for the first time. Both are intended to provide further reassurance that the
tough decisions made in the past have put the UK in a secure position to face the challenges
of the future without resorting to sudden and unexpected changes in policy.





OUTLINE OF THE REPORT
Long-term public finances and the fiscal framework
1.7 The Code for Fiscal Stability requires the Government to specify its objectives for fiscal
policy. The Government’s medium-term objectives for fiscal policy are to ensure sound public
finances and that spending and taxation impact fairly both within and between generations.
Chapter 2 provides a full discussion of the role of long-term projections of public finances in
the Government’s fiscal framework.
1.8 The Government’s fiscal policy is implemented through two fiscal rules – the golden rule
and sustainable investment rule. These rules strengthen the commitment to sustainability
and generational fairness, by specifying that over the economic cycle the Government will
borrow only to invest and not to fund current spending, and that public sector net debt will
be maintained below 40 per cent of GDP over the economic cycle. This report underpins the
Government’s commitment to these objectives over the long term.
1.9 The  Code  for  Fiscal  Stability requires  the  publication  of  the  EFSR,  outlining  the
Government’s long-term goals, strategy for the future, and how it is progressing in meeting its
fiscal policy objectives. Within the EFSR, Annex A assesses the outlook for the long term. This
Report provides an update of the Annex A projections in Chapter 6 and then provides a more
detailed, complementary analysis of long-term fiscal sustainability using a range of indicators.
Long-term challenges
1.10 When assessing the long-term sustainability of the public finances and generational
fairness of current policies, it is necessary to make an assessment of expected future trends.
Chapter 3 looks at these long-term challenges in detail. One significant future development is
the UK's ageing population. The number of people of retirement age is projected to rise over
the coming decades, partly due to the post-war baby boom generation reaching retirement
age, but also due to predicted increases in life expectancy. By contrast, the number of people
of working age is projected to rise only until around 2020-21 before falling back. This implies
that the number of people of retirement age relative to those of working age (the ‘old-age
dependency ratio’) is projected to rise in the coming decades. This change in the population
structure  has  implications  for  spending  and  revenues  that  are  sensitive  to  demographic
change, such as health-care expenditures.
1.11 The  continued  rapid  advancement  of  technological  knowledge,  and  changes  in
expectations and preferences in the consumption of goods and services are also likely to be
important  drivers  of  future  public  finance  trends.  However,  there  is  a  high  degree  of
uncertainty about the nature and timing of these trends that make them difficult to quantify
and model in a long-term study.
2
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Approaches to assessing long-term fiscal sustainability
1.12 The Government already publishes top-down projections in Annex A of the EFSR of the
Budget, and these projections are updated in this Report. Chapter 4 presents some different
approaches to assessing long-term sustainability. The Report quantifies the impact of future
trends on the public finances using fiscal gaps assessed in the context of the Government's
fiscal rules, and generational accounting techniques. The latter uses a model that has been
developed  through  a  project  by  the  National  Institute  of  Economic  and  Social  Research
(NIESR), part-funded by HM Treasury
2.
1.13 The Report complements the fiscal gap and generational accounting concepts with
‘bottom-up’ projections of individual spending items as a share of GDP. Attention is focused
on those items that are most likely to be affected by changing demographic or other long-
term drivers, notably education, pensions and health care.
Assumptions
1.14 Given the high degree of uncertainty regarding future developments, it is important to
state  clearly  the  main  assumptions  used.  The  key  assumptions  used  in  this  Report  are
presented and discussed in Chapter 5. As the Report studies in detail the potential impact of
a changing population structure on the public finances, the demographic assumptions are
crucial.  This  Report  uses  the  Government  Actuary’s  Department’s  2001-based  interim
principal population projections for the UK
3. These take account of the 2001 Census. To
provide a sensitivity analysis, the Report considers a range of plausible productivity growth
and discount/debt interest rate assumptions.
Results
1.15 Chapter 6 provides an update of the illustrative long-term fiscal projections published
in Annex A of Budget 2002, using the medium-term forecast as presented in the 2002 Pre-
Budget Report. As in Budget 2002, the updated projections show that the UK’s public finances
are broadly sustainable. Chapter 6 also presents the results of using the different approaches
given in Chapter 4. These results demonstrate that on the basis of current policies the public
finances are sustainable in the long term and that current policy is broadly generationally
neutral. This confirms earlier findings by HM Treasury, the NIESR and other organisations
such as the OECD. International comparisons also show that the UK is in a strong position to
face the fiscal challenges of an ageing population relative to many other developed countries.
1.16 As  projected,  revenues  are  fairly  insensitive  to  demographic  changes  and  only  fall
marginally as a share of GDP over the next five decades. By contrast, spending is projected to
increase slightly as a share of GDP over the next 30 years and then fall back. So total spending
as a share of GDP is projected to be very similar in 2051-52 as in 2007-08, the end of the
medium-term forecast period. The substantial increase in spending between 2001-02 and
2007-08 largely reflects the Government’s increased spending on public services, in particular
on health and education.
OVERVIEW 1
2  For further details see Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff,
NIESR, 1998.
3 Available at http://www.gad.gov.uk/Population_Projections/Population_projections_background.htm.OVERVIEW
1.17 A detailed breakdown of total spending reveals that the share of age-related spending in
total spending is likely to increase over the coming decades. This is mainly because health
spending is predicted to edge up as a share of GDP. By contrast, other age-related spending
such as education, pensions and long-term care, can be expected to fluctuate around their
current shares. The slight increase in age-related spending (relative to GDP) is predicted to be
more or less offset by lower other spending.
1.18 As with any long-term projection, the results in the Report should be interpreted with
care. The uncertainties looking so far ahead are, of course, enormous. For this reason the
emphasis in this Report is on demonstrating the public finances are sustainable on a range of
plausible  assumptions  for  discount/debt  interest  rates  and  productivity  growth.  Several
specific qualifications are also noted including the uncertainty over future trends in: health
spending, tax revenues and employment.
CONCLUSIONS
1.19 The Long-Term Public Finance Report represents an important strengthening of the UK
fiscal framework. The indicators used in this Report do not supplant the fiscal rules which
govern the Government’s fiscal policy. What the Report does show, using a range of indicators,
is  that  on  plausible  assumptions  and  on  current  policies  the  UK  public  finances  are
sustainable in the long term and are broadly generationally fair. International comparisons
also suggest the UK is in a relatively strong position to face the challenges ahead.
4
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2.1 There has been a shift towards more medium-term planning within fiscal frameworks
by governments around the world, and a greater emphasis on the long term. This has been
motivated mainly by countries attaining control over their short and medium-term fiscal
positions and becoming increasingly aware of the importance of looking at the long term, in
part  so  as  to  prepare  for  the  common  problem  of  an  ageing  population.  The  focus  of
attention has been on long-term fiscal sustainability.
2.2 Sustainable public finances are an essential prerequisite to achieving steady long-term
economic  growth.  Focusing  on  long-term  stability  creates  an  environment  conducive  to
sustained long-term economic growth and should help to promote inter-generational fairness.
2.3 It is important for the Government to have information on the outlook for the long
term, and the long-term implications of current policy. As well as assisting strategic long-
term  decision  making,  more  information  on  the  long  term  greatly  improves  fiscal
transparency and credibility. The next sections look at the UK’s fiscal framework, and present
what information is published in the UK and other countries.
THE UK FISCAL FRAMEWORK
2.4 The UK’s fiscal framework provides the setting for transparent, long-term decision-
making.  The  framework  is  guided  by  the  Code  for  Fiscal  Stability, which  sets  out  a
commitment to managing the public finances in the long-term interests of Britain. The five
key principles of the Code – transparency, stability, responsibility, fairness and efficiency –
also support a long-term focus to policy making.
2.5 Fiscal policy is set with consideration to the short, medium and long term. The Code
requires  the  Government  to  state  its  objectives  and  the  rules  by  which  fiscal  policy  is
operated. The Government’s objectives for fiscal policy are:
• over the medium term, to ensure sound public finances and that spending
and taxation impact fairly both within and between generations; and
• over the short term, to support monetary policy; and, in particular, to allow
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1  See Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy: Towards Greater Economic Stability, edited by Ed Balls and 
Gus O’Donnell, HM Treasury, Palgrave, 2002.
2.6 In the long run, fiscal policy supports the Government’s long-term goals by ensuring
that the public finances are sustainable, contributing to a stable environment that promotes
economic growth. While it is beyond the scope of this Report to explicitly model the linkages
between  long-term  economic  growth  and  long-term  fiscal  policy,  there  exists  a  general
consensus  that  a  stable  environment  assists  economic  growth  in  the  long  run
1.  This
environment is important for achieving the Government’s objective to build a stronger, more
enterprising economy and a fairer society, extending economic opportunity and supporting
those most in need, to ensure that rising national prosperity is shared by all. The objectives
for fiscal policy are summarised in Chart 2.1 alongside the relevant time horizons.
2.7 The Government has formulated two fiscal rules through which the objectives for fiscal
policy are implemented, which also reflect the commitments to fiscal sustainability and
generational fairness. They are:
• the golden rule: over the economic cycle, the Government will borrow only to
invest and not to fund current spending; and
• the sustainable investment rule: public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP
will be held over the economic cycle at a stable and prudent level. Other
things being equal, net debt will be maintained below 40 per cent of GDP over
the economic cycle.
2.8 The golden rule specifies that current spending should be financed by current taxes
(and not by future generations) over the economic cycle, thus ensuring generational fairness
and  fiscal  sustainability.  In  addition,  the  sustainable  investment  rule  ensures  debt
sustainability and also supports generational fairness by limiting the scope for the current
generation to leave excessive debt burdens to future generations.
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Fiscal rules7
2.9 To measure progress against the Government’s commitment to its objectives and long-
term interests, the Code requires the publication of an Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report
(EFSR) outlining the Government’s long-term goals, strategy for the future, and how it is
progressing in meeting its fiscal policy objectives.
PURPOSE OF THIS REPORT
2.10 The Government has already conducted a top-down assessment of long-term fiscal
sustainability in Annex A of the EFSR in Budget 2002 but, due to the modelling approach,
these do not identify specific long-term spending trends. Furthermore, the aggregate nature
of the illustrative long-term fiscal projections makes it difficult to raise awareness for specific
policy choices so that informed decisions can be taken. More specific long-term projections
may  be  useful  to  facilitate  long-term  planning.  For  example,  the  specific  projections  for
health spending in the Wanless Review
2 were helpful in building a consensus on the long-
term direction of policy.
2.11 This Report seeks to extend and complement the analysis in Annex A of the EFSR (which
is updated in this Report) so that the objectives stated in Box 2.1 are met. To this end the
Report aims to provide:
• a comprehensive picture of the sustainability of the public finances over the
long term based on a range of plausible assumptions;
• an indication of the degree of inter-generational fairness;
• better quality information to guide policy and enhance the decision-making
and planning by both the Government and individuals; and
• a framework for examining the effects of demography and other long-term
trends on the public finances.
2.12 This Report does not aim to provide a unique answer to the degree of long-term fiscal
sustainability and inter-generational fairness. Given the high degree of uncertainty of long-
term projections this would be unrealistic.




Box 2.1: The uses of long-term fiscal projections
Long-term fiscal projections can be used to help the Government to meet the following
objectives:
• ascertain the long-term sustainability of public finances;
• provide insights into the issue of inter-generational fairness;
• identify long-term economic trends so as to allow time for planning and changes in
policy; and
• raise public awareness so as to allow informed decisions to be made.
In addition long-term fiscal projections should indicate how well the Government is likely
to perform against its own fiscal rules; in the case of the UK these are the golden rule and
the sustainable investment rule.
Relationship with
Annex A
2 Securing our Future Health: Taking a Long-Term View, Derek Wanless, April 2002.LONG-TERM PUBLIC FINANCES AND THE FISCAL FRAMEWORK
INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE AND BEST PRACTICE 
2.13 The increased emphasis on the long term is reflected in the reporting requirements in
many countries and in international practices for budget transparency. The OECD’s Best
Practices for Budget Transparency state a long-term report: “should be released at least every
five  years,  or  when  major  changes  are  made  in  substantive  revenue  or  expenditure
programmes” and that the report: “should assess the budgetary implications of demographic
change, such as population ageing and other potential developments over the long term…”
3.
The Manual on Fiscal Transparency by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) argues that:
“…policy  commitments  with  a  future  financial  impact  should  be  taken  into  account,
particularly public pension programmes”
4.
2.14 The OECD has produced a number of studies that have looked at the impact of an
ageing population on the future. A 2001 study provides projections on the fiscal impact of
age-related spending for OECD countries for the next 50 years
5. The study was carried out in
collaboration with the European Union’s Economic Policy Committee (EPC) and differs from
previous OECD studies in that it uses a standardised modelling approach and provides more
detailed projections
6.
2.15 Various OECD countries have also published their own long-term reports or included
information on the long term in their annual budgets. Countries that have published long-
term analyses include Australia, Belgium, Finland, France, Ireland, New Zealand and Norway.
In addition, New Zealand and Norway publish assessments of the long term in conjunction
with their regular budgetary cycle. The US publishes assessments of the long term, either
included as part of Budget publications or as separate stand-alone policy briefs
7.
2.16 More  specifically,  within  the  EU  there  has  been  a  greater  interest  in  the  long-term
aspects of the public finances. EU member states, including the UK, presented information
in their 2001 Stability and Convergence Programmes on long-term trends that might affect
the public finances in the future
8.
2.17 With  a  view  to  identifying  the  impact  of  such  long-term  developments,  the  EPC
established a specific working group in 1999, made up of officials from the Member States
and the European Commission, to examine the economic and budgetary implications of
ageing populations. In October 2001 the group published a major study that looked at the
impact of demographic changes on a number of age-related expenditures, with a view to
assessing  the  long-term  sustainability  of  public  finances
9.  ECOFIN  (the  ministers  for
economic affairs and finance in the EU) endorsed the study in November 2001, and requested










3 OECD Best Practices for Budget Transparency, OECD, May 2001, page 6.
4 IMF Manual on Fiscal Transparency, IMF, March 2001, paragraph 103.
5 Fiscal implications of ageing: projections of age-related spending, in OECD Economic Outlook, OECD, June 2001.
6 Previous studies include: Ageing and income: financial resources and retirement in 9 OECD countries, in Social Issues,
OECD, 2001; The macroeconomic implications of ageing in a global context, OECD, 1998; and Ageing population, pension
systems and government budgets: simulations for 20 countries, OECD, 1996.
7 The Bibliography provides more details on these analyses.
8 Convergence Programme 2001: Maintaining Economic Stability, HM Treasury, December 2001.
9 Budgetary Challenges Posed by Ageing Populations, EPC Working Group on Ageing, October 2001.
10 For the press release of the relevant ECOFIN council meeting, see
http://ue.eu.int/Newsroom/LoadDoc.asp?MAX=1&BID=93&DID=68581&LANG=1.9
CONCLUSIONS
2.18 Sustainable  public  finances  are  an  essential  prerequisite  to  achieving  long-term
economic growth. It is therefore important for the Government to have information on the
outlook for the long term, and the long-term implications of current policies.
2.19 This chapter set out the UK fiscal framework and explained the role of long-term fiscal
projections within that framework. The chapter stated that the Government assesses long-
term  fiscal  sustainability  in  Annex  A  of  the  EFSR  and  that  this  Report  extends  and
complements that analysis.
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3.1 This chapter looks at the long-term challenges that could affect current and future fiscal
policies. The  main  focus  is  on  demographic  changes  but  other  potential  trends  such  as
technological advancements, and changing expectations and preferences are also presented.
THE CHANGING STRUCTURE OF THE UK POPULATION
3.2 One of the most important future developments is the continued changing structure of
the  UK’s  population.  In  the  UK  the  Government  Actuary’s  Department  (GAD)  provides
population  projections  based  on  different  scenarios.  GAD  published  updated  principal
projections  in  early  November.  These  interim  2001-based  population  projections  take
account of the findings of the 2001 Census, which showed that the total population was over
one million lower than previously estimated in 2000
1. The Office for National Statistics (ONS)
attributed this to an underestimation of emigration of mainly males between 25-39 years of
age
2.
3.3 GAD’s 2001-based interim principal projections differ from the 2000-based projections
in that they have a lower starting point for total population but also in that they are based on
a lower net migration assumption. A number of international organisations such as Eurostat
(the statistical office of the European Commission) and the United Nations also regularly
publish population projections for the UK.  A comparison of these projections is given in
Table 3.1. The projections in this Report are based on GAD’s 2001-based interim principal
population projections.
Table 3.1: UK population projections (millions)
2000 2010 2015 2020 2050
Government Actuary’s Department 58.8
1 60.3 61.3 62.2 63.7
Eurostat 59.6 60.9 61.5 62.2 61.8
United Nations 59.4 60.3 60.6 60.9 58.9
1 Refers to 2001.
Sources: Government Actuary’s Department (2002), Eurostat (2002) and United Nations (2001).
3.4 According to GAD’s 2001-based interim principal projections the UK population will
rise  from  58.8  million  in  2001  to  nearly  64  million  by  the  mid  2030s.  After  2035  total
population will remain more or less stable until at least 2050, as illustrated in Chart 3.1.
Demography
1  http://www.gad.gov.uk/Population_Projections/Population_projections_background.htm.
2  http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/ provides more details.LONG-TERM CHALLENGES FOR THE PUBLIC FINANCES
3.5 However,  population  projections  this  far  ahead  are  subject  to  a  high  degree  of
uncertainty. This uncertainty is due to a number of factors, including uncertainty regarding
future fertility rates, trends in life expectancy (for newborns and for the current population),
and net migration flows. These factors depend on preferences and social structures (fertility),
technological advances and changing life styles (life expectancy, fertility), and economic,
political and social developments in the UK and abroad (net migration)
3.
3.6 The  UK  population  is  projected  to  age  and  its  composition  to  change  as  a  result.
According to GAD’s 2001-based interim principal projections, the median age will increase
from 38 years in 2001 to around 441/2 years by 2040 before stabilising. The ageing process will
eventually lead to a slight “inversion” of the so-called population pyramid. Chart 3.2 shows
the projected evolution of the UK’s population.
3.7 As can be seen from Chart 3.2 the number of older people is projected to rise over the
coming  decades.  This  is  partly  due  to  the  post-war  baby  boom  generation  reaching
retirement age but also to life expectancy for males and females being predicted to edge up
from 75.7 years in 2001 to 79.9 years in 2050 for males and from 80.4 years to 84.1 years for
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Chart 3.1: Total UK population
millions
Source: Government Actuary's Department, 2001-based interim principal population projections.
3  Alongside its principal projections, GAD also generally publishes variant projections which are based on different
assumptions. However, GAD has not published any 2001-based interim variant projections. Variant projections based on
the findings of the 2001 Census will be published in 2003.























Chart 3.2: UK population by age and sex
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Source: Government Actuary's Department, 2001-based interim principal population projections.
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3.8 The ageing of the UK population can also be illustrated by the evolution of the old-age
dependency ratio. This ratio shows the number of people of retirement age relative to the
number of people of working age
5. As can be seen in Chart 3.3 the old-age dependency ratio
is projected to rise from 30 per cent in 2002 to 32 per cent in 2010 before falling slightly in the
following decade. The fall is due to the fact that the female state pension age will rise from 60
years in 2010 to 65 years in 2020, thereby converging with the male state pension age. Once
the effect of this policy-induced change ceases to have an impact, demographic trends drive
up the old-age dependency ratio to around 40 per cent by 2040.
3.9 The sharp increase after 2020 can be explained by the rise in the number of people aged
65 and over, and by the fall in the number of people of working age. The number of people of
retirement age (taking account of the increase in the female state pension age) is projected to
rise  from  10.9  million  in  2002  to  15.3  million  by  2040,  mainly  reflecting  increases  in  life
expectancy and the retirement of the baby-boom generation. This means that there will be
around four people of retirement age for every ten people of working age by 2040, compared
with around three people of retirement age nowadays.
3.10 The increase in the number of older people is accompanied by a projected slight decline
in the number of people under working age; in other words, those aged 15 years or lower
(Chapter 5, Chart 5.2). With the fertility rate stable, the decline is due to fewer women of
childbearing age in the coming decades.
3.11 The UK’s population is, however, ageing less rapidly than the populations of most EU
member states. Everything else equal, population ageing will therefore have a smaller impact
on the UK than on many EU member states. Table 3.2 presents old-age dependency ratios for
the EU member states (and for some other developed countries) as projected by the United
Nations
6. The table also shows that the ageing trend is not a new phenomenon. Western
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Chart 3.3: Old-age dependency ratio
Per cent
Source: Government Actuary’s Department, historical data and 2001-based interim principal population projections.
Other EU
countries
5  Working-age population is a statistical concept and comprises everyone aged between 15 years and the state pension
age. At present the state pension age for males is 65 years and for females 60 years. However, between 2010 and 2020
the female state pension age will be gradually raised to 65 years.
6  Note that the United Nation’s figures for the UK are based on different assumptions than those published by GAD in its




Table 3.2: Old-age dependency ratios
1 in developed countries
1950 1975 2000 2025 2050
Austria 15.5 24.0 22.9 37.9 62.5
Belgium 16.2 21.8 25.9 38.0 51.2
Denmark 14.1 20.9 22.5 35.8 43.8
Finland10.5 15.8 22.3 41.8 48.8
France 17.3 21.5 24.5 36.2 46.7
Germany 14.5 23.3 24.1 39.0 54.7
Greece 10.5 19.1 26.0 38.1 64.6
Ireland17.7 19.0 16.9 24.5 37.2
Italy  12.6 18.9 26.7 40.6 68.1
Luxembourg 13.9 20.0 21.5 28.5 31.4
Netherlands 12.3 16.9 20.1 34.3 45.0
Portugal 11.0 15.9 23.1 31.7 53.5
Spain 11.1 16.1 24.8 36.1 73.8
Sweden 15.5 23.5 27.1 41.5 54.5
UK 16.0 22.2 24.1 34.8 47.3
Weighted average 
of EU member states 14.3 20.7 24.5 37.1 54.7
Australia 12.4 13.6 18.2 29.2 37.5
Canada 12.2 12.9 18.5 32.6 40.9
Japan 8.3 11.6 25.2 49.0 71.3
New Zealand14.5 14.2 17.9 28.9 38.5
USA 12.8 16.3 18.6 29.3 34.9
1 Those aged 65 years and over as a ratio of those aged between 15 and 64 years.
Source: United Nations, World population ageing 1950–2050, (2001).
OTHER LONG-TERM TRENDS
Technological advances
3.12 A further future trend is likely to be the continued rapid advancement of technological
knowledge. All aspects of society will be affected as innovations transform the way we travel,
purchase, produce and distribute goods and services, and the way we work and spend our
leisure time.
3.13 Technological advances are also likely to transform the supply of health care services in
the UK, with a potentially major impact on the future cost of health services. As shown in the
previous section, life expectancy has risen sharply over the last few decades and is expected
to increase further in the decades ahead, partly due to new drugs and forms of treatment.
Higher life expectancy, in turn, has encouraged the development of new drugs and forms of
treatment, creating pressure to increase spending on further technological advances.
3.14 A survey of 50 leading health economists in 1995 showed that 81 per cent believed
technology was the driving force behind the long-term rise of health care spending
7. The
Wanless Review (2002), commissioned by the Chancellor of the Exchequer in 2001, states
that: “…while some technologies will reduce unit costs, overall new technology is likely to
continue to put upward pressure on health care spending as it enables more people to be
treated and for longer periods of time”
8.
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Wanless Review
7 Health care for the elderly: How much? Who will pay for it?, Victor R. Fuchs, in Health Affairs, 1999.
8 Securing our Future Health: Taking a Long-Term View, Derek Wanless, April 2002, page 52.LONG-TERM CHALLENGES FOR THE PUBLIC FINANCES
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3.15 The Wanless Review quantifies the effect of technology on health spending, estimating
that technology and medical advances have contributed around 2 percentage points to the
annual rate of growth of health spending over the past 20 years. The Wanless Review also
states that over the next 20 years, technology spending will need to grow at a faster rate in the
UK than over the past 20 years to catch up and keep up with other developed countries.
3.16 The Wanless Review emphasises the high degree of uncertainty involved in projecting
medical advances and their likely financial impact on the provision of health services. The
Review cites the wide variety of opinions expressed by experts in the field; for example, no
consensus has so far emerged regarding the future importance of genetics and stem cell
technology. While it is clear that new discoveries will be made in these fields, it is neither
known what they will be nor when they will happen. Given that the projections presented in
this report cover 50 years (compared with the Wanless Review’s 20 years), and the many
different possibilities, the results should be interpreted with care.
Compression of morbidity
3.17 Past experience suggests that the continued rise in life expectancy will be accompanied
by an increase in the number of years people enjoy in good health. This trend is generally
referred to as compression of morbidity. It is therefore likely that demand for health and long-
term care will, everything else equal, be lower for any specific age cohort in the future than it
is today. It has been argued that: “…the best evidence we can find about the United Kingdom
suggests that the factors, which are causing us to live longer are also resulting in the extra
years of life being free from severe disability”
9. This trend can be expected to have a significant
dampening  effect  on  health  and  long-term  care  spending  increases,  at  least  partially
offsetting the impact on the public finances caused by the increase in the number of older
people and the above-mentioned technological advances.
3.18  There  is  an  expanding  academic  literature  that  analyses  the  potential  effect  of  the
compression  of  morbidity  on  the  future  cost  of  long-term  care  provision.  For  the  UK,
Wittenberg et al. (2002)
10, for example, find that public long-term care spending will remain
more  or  less  stable  over  the  next  50  years,  when  including  compression  of  morbidity,
compared with an increase of around 13 per cent when excluded. There is comparatively less
research on the impact of compression of morbidity on health spending.
Changing expectations and preferences
3.19  Expectations and preferences are also likely to change over time. The Wanless Review
considered this influence along with demography, technological change and other factors to
give a full assessment of the resource requirements for a high quality health service. As society
becomes richer and its structure changes, it will demand new goods and services, or more (or
less) of existing goods and services. In principle either the public or private sector could
provide these goods and services. In the context of projections, the problems are the same as
with technological advances: while it is clear that changing expectations and preferences will
affect the future, it is not known when or how.
Healthier, 
longer lives
9 With Respect to Old Age: Long-Term Care - Rights and Responsibilities, The Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, March
1999, paragraph 2.23.
10 Demand for long term care in the UK: projections of long-term care finance for older people to 2051, Raphael Wittenberg,
Ruth Hancock, Adelina Comas-Herrera and Linda Pickard, in A New Contract for Retirement: Modelling Policy Options to
2050, edited by Richard Brooks, Sue Regan and Peter Robinson, 2002.17
3.20  However, a few broad trends can still be predicted from economic theory. As income
rises, citizens will spend disproportionately more on some goods and services
11. There is some
empirical evidence that health care and long-term care are such goods, with individuals
spending a larger share of their income on these services the richer they become. Therefore,
as societies grow richer, it may be the case that larger shares of GDP will be spent on health
care
12.
3.21 There  is  also  empirical  evidence  that  education  is  such  a  good
13.  It  is  possible  that
demand for education (whether for schooling, higher education or life-long learning) will rise
over time and education spending will increase as a share of GDP. The public sector’s role in
providing and financing this good will determine the impact on the public finances.
Changes in productivity growth
3.22 Another important potential development is the rate of underlying productivity growth.
There  are  likely  to  be  both  positive  and  negative  influences  of  an  ageing  society  on
productivity growth. A positive influence could be that a shrinking labour force may have a
positive  impact  on  productivity  growth  through  changes  in  the  capital-labour  ratio.  In
addition,  labour  productivity  may  rise  due  to  an  increase  in  the  average  level  of  work
experience, and therefore a higher average skills level of the work force
14. However, it is also
possible that the ageing of the population might be accompanied by a loss in productivity
performance in the economy, on the basis that older workers are less innovative and less
responsive to change
15. Innovation and technical progress could therefore slow as societies
age.
CONCLUSIONS
3.23 This chapter identified a number of trends that are likely to occur over the coming
decades. These trends are likely to have implications for the public finances. It is important to
ascertain the effects of these trends if an appropriate policy response is to be formulated well
ahead of time.
3.24 The  changing  structure  of  the  UK  population  is  one  such  trend. The  ageing  of  the
population  will  have  implications  for  all  spending  and  revenue  items  sensitive  to
demography. The phenomenon of ageing is also occurring in other developed countries,
particularly other EU member states.
3.25 Amongst other trends, technological change could also have a potential impact on the
public  finances.  However,  given  a  great  deal  of  uncertainty  about  the  direction  and
magnitude  of  the  effect(s),  these  trends  are  difficult  to  quantify  and  model. This  Report
therefore focuses mainly on modelling the changing of the demographic structure. In the next
chapter  the  approaches  used  to  assess  the  potential  effect  on  the  public  finances  are
examined.
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11 These are termed “luxury goods” in the economics literature.
12 With Respect to Old Age: Long-Term Care - Rights and Responsibilities, The Royal Commission on Long-Term Care, March
1999.
13 See Public Finances in EMU 2002, European Commission, 2002, page 69; and Fiscal policy and the size of governments,
Carlos Martinez-Mongay, in The Behaviour of Fiscal Authorities edited by Marco Buti, Jürgen von Hagen and Carlos
Martinez-Mongay, 2002.
14 For empirical evidence see An aging society: opportunity or challenge? David M. Cutler, James M. Poterba, Louise M.
Sheiner, and Lawrence H. Summers, in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990, and Is growth exogenous? Taking
Mankiw, Romer and Weil seriously, Ben Bernanke and Refet Gurkaynak, in NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001, edited by
Ben Bernanke and Kenneth Rogoff, 2001.
15 See, for example, The Birth Dearth: What Happens When People in Free Countries Don't Have Enough Babies?, Ben
Wattenberg, 1987 and Capital, labor and productivity, Paul Romer in Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1990.184




4.1 This chapter sets out the different techniques to assess long-term fiscal sustainability. It
shows the methodology used in the illustrative long-term fiscal projections in Annex A of the
Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (EFSR), as well as further approaches that can be used
to analyse the long-term fiscal sustainability of current policies. Three different techniques
are  discussed  in  detail:  fiscal  gap  modelling,  generational  accounting  and  a  bottom-up
approach, with each approach’s strengths and weaknesses highlighted. 
LONG-TERM FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY MEASURES
4.2 Governments issue debt (or borrow) to allow the smoothing of expenditure over time.
This smoothing takes place so that even if unforeseen changes in tax revenues occur (due to say,
fluctuations in the economy), spending programmes do not have to be changed immediately.
If borrowing were not possible, then the government would need to either maintain a stock of
assets, or tax rates would need to rise and fall each year to meet the cost of existing spending
plans.  By  borrowing,  governments  are  able  to  help  smooth  household  incomes  over  the
business cycle, and therefore help to stabilise output in the face of economic shocks.
4.3 However, there are limits to how much a government can borrow. Too high a level of
public debt may lead to a number of adverse outcomes:
• less favourable combinations of interest rates and economic growth;
• debt servicing requirements may become unsustainable without a tightening
in the fiscal position; and
• the  long-term  credibility  of  the  government  (and  successive  governments)
may be damaged. So even if a prudent fiscal policy were announced later,
markets  may  not  regard  such  an  announcement  as  credible.  This  might
hamper  growth  and  stability  even  after  the  level  of  public  debt  has  been
brought under control.
4.4 Long-term  fiscal  sustainability  involves  the  ability  of  a  government  to  meet  its
obligations over time
1. It is therefore important that government debt is kept at a sustainable
level  over  time.  For  this  reason  the  UK  operates  the  sustainable  investment  rule  which
requires that public sector net debt as a proportion of GDP is held over the economic cycle at
a stable and prudent level.
Updated illustrative long-term fiscal projections
4.5 Within  the  EFSR,  the  Code  for  Fiscal  Stability
2 requires  that  illustrative  long-term
projections of the outlook for the key fiscal aggregates are presented for a period of no less
than 10 years into the future, based on a range of plausible assumptions, so as to shed light
on the inter-generational impact and sustainability of fiscal policy.
4.6 These projections are presented in Annex A of the EFSR and have in practice covered a
30-year time horizon. The projections are derived using a top-down approach. One of the
main strengths of this approach is that it can be based on the assumption that the fiscal rules
1 For a more detailed discussion on government solvency and sustainability, see Reforming Britain’s Economic 
and Financial Policy, edited by Ed Balls and Gus O’Donnell, HM Treasury, Palgrave, 2002.
2 Code for Fiscal Stability, HM Treasury, March 1998.are met. As such, the top-down approach answers the question what resources are available
for future spending, assuming that the fiscal rules are always met. In particular, the illustrative
long-term fiscal projections presented in Annex A of the EFSR calculate at what rate current
consumption  (for  example  current  spending  on  health  and  education)  can  grow  while
allowing the Government to meet its fiscal rules.
Intertemporal budget constraint
4.7 To formalise the assessment of sustainability, the government’s obligations over time








Ss(1+r)–s+t + D (1)
where Rs is revenue in year s, Ss is spending in year s, r is the discount rate, t is the current
year and D is the initial stock of net debt
3. The intertemporal budget constraint states that all
current  and  future  revenue  streams  should  be  sufficient  to  cover  all  current  and  future
spending streams, and to pay off current debt. The constraint requires that a government’s
debt,  on  average,  is  not  growing  at  too  fast  a  rate,  given  the  level  of  interest  rates  and
economic growth rates
4.
4.8 Spending and revenues are discounted to the current year, time t, using a discount rate,
in other words multiplied by a factor of (1+r)-s+t where (s-t) is the number of years into the
future. The adjustment reflects that the value society puts on £1 today, may not be the same
as £1 in say, ten years time. This can be due to reasons such as preferences over time or future
uncertainty.
Fiscal gaps
4.9 There  are  a  number  of  measures  which  can  be  used  to  assess  long-term  fiscal
sustainability. Under certain assumptions, for example, a constant debt to GDP ratio will
meet the IBC (over an infinite time horizon). One measure of sustainability is the difference
between the current primary balance and the primary balance needed to achieve a constant
debt to GDP ratio. Another measure is the fiscal gap, which uses the IBC to calculate the
immediate and permanent change in the primary balance needed to achieve a certain debt
target in the future
5.
4.10 Eliminating, or “closing” the fiscal gap involves changing taxes or spending which affect
the primary balance to reach the pre-determined debt target. The required change in the
















3 Revenue, spending and debt are in real terms.  
4 For the intertemporal budget constraint to be satisfied, it is required that on average the stock of debt grows at a rate
smaller than r,                     , where Ds is the level of (net) debt in year s, and r is the real interest rate in year s. 
This condition is also known as a “no Ponzi” finance condition. However, if there exists a rate of economic growth g, 
which is greater than r, then debt can grow at a faster rate than r and the government can remain solvent. See
Reforming Britain’s Economic and Financial Policy, edited by Ed Balls and Gus O’Donnell, HM Treasury, Palgrave, 2002,
page 170 for further details. 
5 This definition follows The US fiscal problem: where we are, how we got there, and where we’re going, Alan Auerbach, in
NBER Macroeconomics Annual, edited by Stanley Fischer and Julio Rotemberg, 1994.







where t is the initial year, T is the target year, r is the interest rate, g is the real growth rate of
output, dt is the initial (and target) debt to GDP ratio and pbs is the primary balance to GDP
ratio in year s. The formula can be modified for a different desired level of debt in target year
T  to  the  initial  debt  level.  Various  countries,  such  as  the  USA  and  New  Zealand
6 have
estimated the magnitude of their fiscal gaps
7. 
Generational accounting
4.11 The technique of generational accounting uses the IBC to calculate whether there is a
“gap” in the long-term public finances. If current and future revenues are not sufficient to
cover  current  and  future  spending  and  current  debt,  for  a  given  finite  period,  then  the
government will either have to raise revenue or lower spending (or a combination of the two)
to close the gap. The extent of the imbalance is called the intertemporal budget gap (IBG), and






where PBs is the primary balance (revenue Rs less spending Ss) in year s. The key difference
between equations (1) and (3) is that the former has an infinite time horizon, while the latter
has a finite horizon T by which debt has to be eliminated.
4.12 The generational accounts provide a too strict measure of long-term fiscal sustainability
in that it requires the complete elimination of debt at the end of the chosen time horizon T.
For  example,  Balassonne  and  Franco  have  argued  that: “…the  main  problem  specific  to
generational accounting is the upward bias its methodology induces in the assessment of the
effort  needed  to  ensure  solvency.  Given  the  existence  of  debt,  the  imposition  of  an
intertemporal  budget  constraint  implies  it  will  have  to  be  repaid”
7.  However,  fiscal
sustainability does not require zero debt. The UK Government’s sustainable investment rule
requires public sector net debt to remain below 40 per cent of GDP over the economic cycle.
Nonetheless, the IBG is useful as a measure to make international comparisons.
4.13 The  generational  accounting  technique  calculates  the  immediate  and  permanent
change in the primary balance that is needed so that the IBG will equal zero for a finite time
horizon. The  differences  between  the  fiscal  gap  and  generational  accounts  measures  are
examined further in the Technical Annex. 
4.14 Based  on  information  on  demographic  developments,  generational  accounting
calculates the effects of a given policy on the revenue and spending of current, as well as
future, generations. Using assumptions for the discount rate and the time horizon, the IBG is
then  calculated  using  equation  (3)  above. The  IBG  can  be  used  to  assess  the  long-term
sustainability of the public finances. In this Report the time horizon T is set to 100 years.
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6 See The Long-Term Budget Outlook, Congressional Budget Office, in Long-term Budgetary Pressures and Policy Options, 1998
and The Long-Term Budget Outlook: an Update, Congressional Budget Office, 1999, and Long-term fiscal projections and
their relationship with the intertemporal budget constraint: an application to New Zealand, John Janssen, 2002.  
7 Another related measure is the “tax gap” which calculates the difference between the current tax rate and the tax rate
that should prevail so that the debt to GDP ratio remains unchanged over the relevant time horizon. For further details
see The sustainability of fiscal policy: new answers to an old question, Olivier Blanchard et al, in OECD Economic Studies,
1999. 
8 See Assessing fiscal sustainability: a review of methods with a view to EMU, Fabrizio Balassonne and Daniele Franco, in
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4.15 To get a feel for the relative magnitude of the imbalance (if any), the intertemporal
budget gap is often expressed either as a percentage of GDP or in terms of a specific revenue
item. The latter interpretation is that to restore balance the revenue item would have to be
raised  (or  lowered  if  there  is  a  negative  gap)  by  a  certain  percentage  today,  and  a
proportionate increase (decrease) to be carried forward into the future.
4.16 The concept of the intertemporal budget gap can be illustrated using a simple example,
as set out below.
The intertemporal budget gap: a simple example
4.17 Table 4.1 provides a simple illustration of the intertemporal budget gap. Consider a
country that has only two spending and two revenue items. In the past it has accumulated
debt of 5 units. In the first and second year (which could be called the short to medium term)
the country runs a balanced budget, but total spending is assumed to exceed total revenue in
years 3 to 6 (the long term). For the illustration, it does not matter why real spending increases
more rapidly than revenue in the long term. This could be, for example, due to higher health
spending as the population ages.
4.18 Looking only at the budget balance in years 1 and 2 it could be concluded that the
country’s public finances are sustainable. However, looking further ahead the country faces a
substantial fiscal imbalance, with the sum of discounted revenue over the 6 years being lower
than the sum of discounted spending.
Table 4.1: Illustrative example of revenue and spending projections
(In real terms)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Revenue
Item 1 7.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0
Item 2 7.0 9.0 9.0 10.0 12.0 14.0
Spending
Item 1 10.0 12.0 13.0 15.0 15.0 17.0
Item 2 4.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 9.0
Budget Balance 0.0 0.0 –2.0 –3.0 –3.0 –3.0
(In present discounted value terms, with discount rate of 3 per cent)
Revenue
Item 1 7.0 7.8 7.5 7.3 7.1 7.8 44.5
Item 2 7.0 8.7 8.5 9.2 10.7 12.1 56.1
Spending
Item 1 10.0 11.7 12.3 13.7 13.3 14.7 75.6
Item 2 4.0 4.9 5.7 5.5 7.1 7.8 34.9
Total present value of net transfers –9.9
Outstanding Assets/Debt –5.0
Intertemporal Budget Imbalance –14.9
To restore Intertemporal Budget Balance
In terms of Revenue Item 1 (per cent) 33.5
In terms of Revenue Item 2 (per cent) 26.6
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4.19 This is illustrated in the present discounted values. Assuming a discount rate of 3 per
cent, the total present value of net transfers is –9.9 units. Adding outstanding debt yields an
intertemporal  budget  imbalance  of  –14.9  units.  To  restore  intertemporal  balance  total
discounted revenue would therefore have to rise by 14.9 units or spending to fall by the same
amount. For example Revenue Item 1 would have to be raised by the factor (44.5 + 14.9)/44.5
(in other words 331/2 per cent) in every year to close the gap. This percentage is known as the
intertemporal budget gap
9.
4.20 To verify that raising Revenue Item 1 by around a third in every year will establish
intertemporal balance, it is possible to rerun the above example with the higher values for
Revenue Item 1. This is shown in Table 4.2. Revenue Item 2 and the spending items remain
the same as in Table 4.1. If revenue is increased by the percentage stated in the intertemporal
budget gap, the budget is balanced over time, or intertemporal budget balance is restored
10.
Table 4.2: Illustrative example of revenue and spending projections with increased revenue
(In real terms, with Revenue Item 1 increased by 331/2 per cent)
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
Revenue
Item 1 9.3 10.7 10.7 10.7 10.7 12.0
Budget Balance 2.3 2.7 0.7 –0.3 –0.3 0.0
(In present discount value terms, with discount rate of 3 per cent)
Revenue
Item 1 9.3 10.4 10.1 9.8 9.5 10.4 59.4
Total present value of net transfers 5.0
Outstanding Assets/Debt –5.0
Intertemporal Budget Imbalance 0.0
4.21 In addition, generational accounting provides a measure of the degree to which current
fiscal policies favour a particular generation. For the UK, it therefore provides an indicator of
how far the Government is achieving its fiscal policy objective of ensuring that spending and
taxation impact fairly between generations (paragraph 2.5). For example, if current policy
means that present revenue levels are insufficient to cover present spending, taxes will have
to be raised in the future. This policy would disadvantage future generations and favour
current generations. 
4.22 The inter-generational balance gap (IGG) gives the amount by which current taxes have
to rise (or fall), or spending has to fall (or rise), so that a current newborn and a future
newborn are equally well off. The comparison is made with current newborns, rather than all
past newborns (existing generations), since although the current Government can affect the
lifetime tax burden for current and future newborns, it can only partially affect the lifetime tax
burden for existing generations. This is because existing generations have already faced past
tax regimes, set by previous governments. An illustrative example is given in Box 4.1 with the
technical details for the calculation of the IGG examined in the Technical Annex.
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9  The required increase of Revenue Item 1 could also be expressed in terms of GDP (not presented in this example). This
is the presentation chosen in this Report in Chapter 6.
10 The example of the intertemporal budget gaps does not take into account any feedbacks between taxation, expenditure
and growth. This feedback effect is likely to be small with small changes in taxes and expenditure.
Inter-
generational
balanceBox 4.1: An illustrative example of generational fairness
The example in this box illustrates how one might think about inter-generational fairness.
The precise measure of inter-generational fairness is not illustrated in Table 4.3 but is
discussed in the Technical Annex. Consider two countries, 1 and 2. Both countries have an
intertemporal budget gap (IBG) of zero, in other words the present discounted value of all
future  spending  equals  that  of  all  future  revenue  (assume  no  net  assets  in  period  1).
However, while both countries have the same profile of future revenue, the profile of the
spending streams is different. 
Table 4.3: An example of generational fairness
Year 1 2 3 4 5 6 Total
1
Country 1
Revenue 10 11 12 13 14 15 69.3
Spending 10 11 12 13 14 15 69.3
Country 2
Revenue 10 11 12 13 14 15 69.3
Spending 15 14 13 12 11 8.7 69.3
1 Total of present discounted values, using a discount rate of 3 per cent.
While in Country 1 spending rises in line with revenue (and hence every generation pays
exactly for its own spending), in Country 2 the current generations (those in years 1, 2 and
3) spend considerably more than they raise in revenue. By contrast, future generations
spend less than they raise in revenue. Current policy is therefore generationally neutral in
Country 1 but not in Country 2, where current policy disadvantages future generations
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Chart 4.1: An illustration of inter-generational fairness
Country 1 Country 2
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44.23 The main strength of generational accounts, which are generally based on national
accounts classifications, is that they provide a comprehensive and comparable picture of the
long-term sustainability of the public finances. In addition, generational accounts provide
indicators that can be used alongside more established indicators of sustainability such as the
budget balance and the debt to GDP ratio.
4.24 There are also a number of drawbacks of the generational accounts methodology. First,
due to their degree of aggregation, the generational accounts indicators do not reveal where
the  imbalance  (if  any)  might  arise.  However,  this  information  can  be  derived  using  the
projections  incorporated  in  the  generational  accounts.  Second,  as  stated  above,  the
indicators are too strict when translated into a finite time horizon. They require that all debt
is paid in full at the end of the period T. In practice, fiscal sustainability does not equate to
zero debt. Third, generational accounts cannot distinguish between current consumption
(which  benefits  current  generations)  and  investment  (which  benefits  current  and  future
generations). This is discussed in Box 4.2. This could lead to a distorted view of the degree of
inter-generational  fairness.  In  the  Technical  Annex  the  illustrative  example  of  inter-
generational  fairness  presented  in  Box  4.1  is  extended  to  show  the  importance  of
distinguishing between current consumption and investment. Further, Buiter has argued that
the  IGG  is  not  a  particularly  useful  indicator  of  the  inter-generational  distribution  of
resources
11.





Box 4.2: Generational accounts and the treatment of investment
As  generational  accounting  does  not  distinguish  between  current  consumption  (which
benefits  current  generations)  and  investment  and  the  assets  it  creates  (which  benefit
current and future generations) on the spending side, this needs to be taken into account
when interpreting the results
1. This distinction is particularly important in the UK for two
reasons:
• The Government has the explicit target to raise public sector net investment to 
2 per cent of GDP by 2005-06 to address the historic under-investment in public
infrastructure.
• Public  sector  net  investment  can  play  an  important  role  in  raising  the  UK’s
potential long-term growth rate.
The  importance  of  the  distinction  between  current  consumption  and  investment  is
reflected  in  the  Government’s  two  fiscal  rules,  the  golden  rule  and  the  sustainable
investment rule (see paragraph 2.7).
In  interpreting  the  results  in  this  Report  on  the  intertemporal  budget  gap  and  inter-
generational balance gap, it is therefore important to keep in mind that the results may
give  too  unfavourable  impression  of  the  position  of  future  generations.  Regarding  the
intertemporal balance, public sector investment may have a positive effect on long-term
economic growth, making it easier for the government to finance future spending plans.
Even if this is not the case and there is no effect on the intertemporal balance, the inter-
generational balance is biased by not distinguishing between current consumption and
investment.  Other  things  equal,  an  inter-generational  imbalance  that  favours  current
generations will overstate the degree of imbalance.
1 See Should generational accounts replace budget deficits? Robert Haveman, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 1994 for 
further details.
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11 See Generational accounts, aggregate saving and intergenerational distribution, Willem H. Buiter, Economica, 1997 for
further details. For example, Buiter also argues that the generational accounts are only useful if the strict life-cycle
model of household consumption holds. A further drawback is that the generational accounts do not handle general
equilibrium repercussions.APPROACHES TO ASSESSING LONG-TERM FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY
4.25 For these reasons, and because the IGG proves to be very sensitive to small changes in
the  underlying  assumptions,  this  Report does  not  put  much  weight  on  this  indicator.  In
addition,  there  are  alternative  ways  to  think  about  inter-generational  fairness.  The
Government’s  golden  rule  and  sustainable  investment  rule  are  just  two  (interlinked)
examples.
Generational accounts and public policy
4.26 Generational  accounting  was  developed  in  the  mid  1980s  to  early  1990s  as  a  more
comprehensive public finance indicator than existing measures such as the budget balance
and the debt to GDP ratio
12. The technique of generational accounting has been used by a
number  of  countries  and  international  organisations  to  inform  public  policy  decisions.
International  organisations  have  included  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF),
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), European Commission
and  the  World  Bank.  In  addition,  the  Congressional  Budget  Office  and  the  Office  of
Management and Budget in the U.S., the New Zealand Treasury, the Norwegian Ministry of
Finance, and the Bank of Japan have used generational accounts in their analysis.  A study by
the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) in 1999 published generational accounts
for 17 countries
13.
4.27 The first set of generational accounts for the UK was published in 1998. These were
produced by the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) with partial
funding from HM Treasury. The accounts were then updated by NIESR prior to Budget 2002.
Both sets of accounts suggest that the UK’s public finances are broadly sustainable in the long




4.28 The bottom-up approach is a popular technique that has been used to project the path
of individual revenue and spending items as a share of GDP into the future. Like generational
accounts, bottom-up projections can be constructed using demographic developments, cost
and demand drivers, and investment requirements. These projections can then be used to
identify future fiscal pressures, and various “what if” scenarios can be simulated.
4.29 Unlike generational accounts, bottom-up projections are not generally used to examine
whether  the  intertemporal  budget  constraint  is  satisfied.  This  is  because  bottom-up
projections often do not consider all spending and revenue items, instead focusing on a
smaller number of items, and are for a shorter time horizon than generational accounts.
4.30 Bottom-up projections are nevertheless valuable in showing how different spending
and revenue items might evolve over time, either in absolute terms or relative to GDP. In
doing this, the projected primary balance, or the “fiscal pressure” over the long term can be
examined. Countries such as Australia have used this technique
14in evaluating the outlook for
the long term. The change in projected expenditure on the programmes studied can provide
an  indication  of  what  might  need  to  happen  to  spending  or  taxation  to  reduce  or  even
eliminate any existing fiscal imbalance. In addition, bottom-up projections are a useful input
26
4
12 Generational accounts: a meaningful alternative to deficit accounting, Alan Auerbach, Jagadeesh Gokhale, and Laurence J. 
Kotlikoff, in Tax Policy and the Economy, edited by David Bradford, 1991.
13 Generational Accounting Around the World, edited by Alan Auerbach, Laurence Kotlikoff and Willi Leibfritz, 1999.
14 Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, NIESR, 1998 
and  NIESR press release 15 April 2002.





in calculating sustainability measures such as the tax gap, or fiscal gap
16. As such the bottom-
up approach is well-suited to alert policy makers to potential future spending pressures (or
revenue shortfalls) and as such provides useful insights into the long-term sustainability of
the public finances.
CONCLUSIONS
4.31 In  addition  to  the  top-down  approach  used  in  the  illustrative  long-term  fiscal
projections  presented  in  Annex  A  of  the  EFSR,  this  chapter  presented  the  various  other
approaches used in this Report to assess the long-term sustainability of the public finances.
The main characteristics of these are given below:
Fiscal gaps:
• show by how much the primary balance needs to be raised or lowered as a
percentage of GDP to achieve a pre-determined debt to GDP ratio at some
specific point in the future;
• can be derived using underlying cost and demand drivers, and demographic
projections;
• have as key variables the primary balance and the debt to GDP ratio at the
initial point and the debt to GDP target at some specific point in the future;
and
• are widely used to analyse long-term sustainability of the public finances.
Generational Accounts:
• show whether the government balances its budget over time, and whether
current policies are inter-generationally fair;
• are mainly derived from demographic projections and cohort-related revenue
and spending profiles;
• do not model debt interest payments explicitly, (in other words focus on the
primary balance) and hence do not project the debt to GDP ratio;
• have as key variables the intertemporal budget gap and inter-generational
balance gap;
• provide, in the form of the intertemporal budget gap, a strict measure of long-
term sustainability in that they require the elimination of debt within a finite
time horizon;
• present a potentially misleading picture of inter-generational fairness as they
do  not  distinguish  between  current  consumption  and  investment  in  their
present form; and
• have been applied mostly by academic researchers to date.
APPROACHES TO ASSESSING LONG-TERM FISCAL SUSTAINABILITY 4
16 The Technical Annex provides further details.Bottom-up projections:
• show the evolution of individual spending and revenue items over the long
term;
• can be derived from underlying cost and demand drivers, and demographic
projections, but are often less detailed than generational accounts;
• have as key variables spending and revenue items as percentages of GDP;
• have  been  widely  used,  including  by  governments,  to  examine  long-term
spending pressures; and
• provide  another  indicator  of  long-term  sustainability  by  providing
information on the evolution of total spending as a share of GDP.









5.2 As discussed in Chapter 3, one of the main trends in the coming decades will be the
changing structure of the UK population, in particular the ageing of the 1960s baby-boom
generation.  The  projections  in  this  Report  are  based  on  the  Government  Actuary’s
Department’s 2001-based interim UK population projections
1.
5.3 Chart 5.1 shows the likely evolution of the number of people of working age over the
coming decades. A statistical concept of working age is used in that it includes all males
between 16 and 65 years and all females between 16 and 60 years (rising to 65 years by 2020).
The continued rise between 2010-11 and 2020-21 is entirely due to the increase of the female
state pension age from 60 years in 2010 to 65 years by 2020. The number of people of working
age will reach its peak in 2021-22 at around 39 million. Once this policy-induced change
ends, working-age population is projected to decrease until the mid 2030s, before stabilising
around 371/2 million thereafter.
5.4 For illustrative purposes Chart 5.1 also shows how the working-age population would
most likely evolve if the female state pension age were to remain constant at 60 years in
the decades ahead. As can be seen the working-age population would increase to around
37.3 million in 2012-13, remain stable until 2021-22 and then fall until 2031-32. After that it













Chart 5.1: UK population of working age
millions
2051 2041 2031 2021 2011 2001
Principal projections Female state pension age constant
Source: Government Actuary’s Department, 2001-based interim principal population projections.ASSUMPTIONS
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5.5 Chart 5.2 shows the evolution of the number of people above and below working age
over the same time horizon. As can be seen the number of people above working age is
expected to rise from around 10.8 million in 2001 to nearly 12 million within a decade and
then remain stable until around 2020-21. The relative stability over that decade is due to the
fact that the state pension age for females rises from 60 to 65 years between 2010 and 2020.
This gradual reclassification of females aged between 60 and 65 years from being “above
working age” to “of working age” offsets the underlying ageing process. The real magnitude of
the ageing process becomes apparent only after 2020 when the policy-induced dampening
effect ceases. The number of people above working age is set to rise to 15.3 million by 2040.
By contrast, the number of people aged between 0 and 15 years is projected to decline by
nearly 1 million from 11.9 million in 2001 to 11 million by 2015-16 and then to fluctuate
around that level.
Labour-market assumptions
5.6 The Report requires assumptions on the labour-market participation rates and the
unemployment rate. These are needed for a number of reasons:
• social  transfers  such  as  unemployment  benefits  are  a  function  of
unemployment rates;
• future public pension expenditure depends on entitlements
2. For example, the
gradual rise in the female participation rate will, everything else equal, lead to
higher pension spending in the future as these women enter retirement age;
and
Chart 5.2: UK population below and above working age
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Source: Government Actuary’s Department, 2001-based interim principal population projections.
2 To be entitled to the full basic state pension, individuals must have reached state retirement age, 65 years for males and
60 years for females (the latter will be raised to 65 years between 2010 and 2020). In addition, individuals are generally
required to have paid, and/or have been credited as having paid, National Insurance Contributions for about 90 per cent
of their working life in order to receive the full basic State Pension.31
• assumptions  on  working-age  population,  and  labour-market  participation
and unemployment rates (and hence the employment rate) are needed to
derive employment levels. These in turn are necessary (alongside productivity
assumptions, see below) to derive future GDP levels.
5.7 For simplicity it is assumed that the overall employment rate remains unchanged from
2007-08 onwards, the end of the medium-term forecast period. Up to 2007-08, the projections
are consistent with the medium-term projections in the 2002 Pre-Budget Report
3. This means
that changes in employment levels are entirely due to changes in the working-age population.
5.8 The above assumption ignores the potential effect of the increase of the state pension
age for females from 60 to 65 years between 2010 and 2020 on the employment rate of the
working-age population. This is because it is difficult to predict the participation rate of
females aged between 60 and 65 years in the future. Under the reasonable assumption that
the participation rate of females aged 60 to 65 years will be similar to that of females aged 55
to 59 years, the employment rate of the working-age population might be expected to fall.
However, as older females present only a small fraction of the working-age population, the
impact is likely to be small.
5.9 Focusing only on the working-age population, the above assumption also ignores any
potential future trends in the number of people employed above state pension age. With life
expectancy continuing to rise and the number of years that can be enjoyed in good health
likely to increase as well, it is possible that the number of older people that work beyond state
pension age will rise. This potential positive effect on employment growth is excluded from
the projections.
Productivity
5.10 The productivity growth assumption used in the baseline scenario is 2 per cent per
year. This is the average long-term productivity growth rate for the UK since the mid 1950s. It
is also the neutral productivity assumption used in the Government’s medium-term forecast
as derived and discussed in the Budget 2002 publication on trend growth
4.
5.11 However, lower and higher productivity growth assumptions of 13/4 per cent and 21/4
per cent per year respectively are also used to provide some sensitivity analysis. Annex A of
the Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (EFSR) stresses that the lower productivity growth
assumption is cautious. The higher productivity growth assumption is included as there is
some potential upward pressure to productivity growth in the medium term
5.
Gross Domestic Product (GDP)
5.12 Given assumptions regarding employment and productivity growth, it is possible to
derive projected GDP growth beyond the end of the medium-term forecast period. Table 5.1




3 2002 Pre-Budget Report, HM Treasury, November 2002.
4 Trend Growth: Recent Developments and Prospects, HM Treasury, April 2002.
5 Trend Growth: Recent Developments and Prospects, HM Treasury, April 2002.ASSUMPTIONS
Table 5.1: Real GDP growth and its components in the baseline scenario (per cent)
1
Year 2011-12 2021-22 2031-32 2041-42 2051-52
to 2020–21 to 2030-31 to 2040-41 to 2050-51 to 2060-61
Productivity 22222
Employment 1/4 –1/4 00 – 1/4
Real GDP 21/4 13/4 22 1 3/4
1 Productivity growth per year of 13/4 per cent and 21/4 per cent is assumed in the two alternative scenarios.
Discount/ debt interest rate
5.13 The fiscal gap and generational accounts approaches described in Chapter 4 require a
discount/debt interest rate assumption. Everything else equal, a higher discount rate means
less importance is attached to distant future developments relative to the present and the
near future. The discount rate therefore represents the social time preference rate, in other
words the rate that reflects the value society places on consumption of goods and services
now, compared with consumption in the future.
5.14 A discount rate can be derived from data on long-term real interest rates based on
index-linked gilts. As Chart 5.3 shows, real interest rates have varied between 2 per cent and
5 per cent since 1982, and have remained between 2 per cent and 3 per cent since 1997,
averaging less than 21/2 per cent since 2000. The Report presents results based on discount




6 Cardarelli et al. assume discount rates of 3, 5 (as their central case) and 7 per cent. See Generational accounting in the
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Chart 5.3: Real interest rates
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Per cent
Source: Bank of England, www.bankofengland.co.uk/statistics/yieldcurve.33
5.15 The discount rate assumptions are in line with the recommendations of the Green
Book
7. The Green Book is a best practice guide for all central government departments and
executive  agencies  on  the  process  of  project  appraisal  and  evaluation.  The  Green  Book
recommends  a  discount  rate  of  31/2 per  cent  but  also  states  that  there  are  a  number  of
circumstances  (for  example,  when  the  impacts  occur  over  the  long  term,  as  in  these
calculations  of  long-term  fiscal  sustainability)  in  which  a  lower  discount  rate  may  be
appropriate.
Spending and revenue assumptions
5.16 The long-term projections are based on the assumption of current policy; in other
words, it is assumed that the Government will leave current policy unchanged in the future.
This should not be interpreted as meaning that policy will not change over time, but it is used
so that the long-term projections do not prejudge future Government policy. This assumption
is frequently used in long-term projections; for example, in the illustrative long-term fiscal
projections  in  Annex  A  of  the  EFSR  and  by  the  European  Union’s  Economic  Policy
Committee
8.
5.17 Current policy has been interpreted as all policy already in place or announced in this
year’s Pre-Budget Report. As such, spending and revenue forecasts up to 2007-08 are included,
using the departmental breakdown as presented in the 2002 Spending Review as a reference
on the spending side
9. For 2006–07 and 2007–08 stylised assumptions regarding growth of
education and other spending apart from health are made. Current policy thereafter refers to
the level of per-capita revenue and spending in 2007-08 rather than the real growth rate.
5.18 The spending and revenue projections are based on separate spending and revenue
profiles for males and females. These profiles have been calculated by the National Institute
of Economic and Social Research (NIESR), and used before in the context of generational
accounts for the UK, derived from household or individual micro-data
10. The same profiles
are used to derive bottom-up projections of key spending programmes.
5.19 The  profiles  show  the  distribution  of  total  spending  and  total  revenue  across  age
cohorts, and vary according to sex. The age aspect of the profiles allows the inter-generational
aspects of the public finances to be examined. The profiles are best explained with the help of
illustrative examples. The first example is given in Chart 5.4 which shows how education
spending  for  females  on  schools  and  full-time  higher  education  is  allocated  across  the
different age groups.
ASSUMPTIONS 5
7 The Green Book Draft under consultation Annex 7, HM Treasury, July 2002.
8 Budgetary Challenges Posed by Ageing Populations, EPC Working Group on Ageing, October 2001.
9 2002 Spending Review: Opportunity and security for all: investing in an enterprising fairer Britain, HM Treasury, July 2002.
10 For more details on how the specific profiles have been derived see Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto
Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Economic Journal, 2000. The profiles presented here are updated







5.20 As expected, most of the spending on schools occurs on those between the ages of five
and 16, with females in each cohort within this age band receiving around 8 per cent of total
spending on schools (on females). Spending on higher education is concentrated on a higher
age group than spending on schools and is allocated over fewer years. This reflects the fact
that higher education degrees generally take between three and four years. It can be seen
from the chart that females aged 20 receive around a fifth of total higher education spending
(on females). The age cohorts of 30 years and over receive relatively small shares of higher
education spending as only few women of those ages are in full-time higher education.
5.21 The second example considers income tax and incapacity benefits for males. As can be
seen from Chart 5.5, males aged 17 years or less do not contribute to the Government’s overall
income tax revenue, and males of 65 years and older only contribute a small proportion. The
former observation is explained by the fact that younger males are generally in education and
do  not  earn  income  on  which  they  have  to  pay  income  tax. The  second  observation  is
explained  by  the  fact  that  males  reach  retirement  age  at  65  years,  with  labour-market
participation  rates  falling  rapidly  from  then  on.  Males  between  30  years  and  50  years
contribute the most to overall income tax revenue. The gradual decline between 50 and 65










0 10 20 30 40 50 60
Chart 5.4: Profiles of education spending (net intermediate 
consumption, females, per cent of total)
Age
Schools Full-time higher education35
5.22 The distribution of incapacity benefits across the age cohorts reflects to a large extent
increasing incapacity with age. Older males leave the labour force, many of whom claim an
incapacity benefit. An average male aged 64 receives 8 per cent of the total incapacity benefits
paid out to males. The drop at 65 years to zero is due to the fact that males reach the state
pension age at 65 years and move from receiving an incapacity benefit to receiving the basic
state pension.
5.23 Chart 5.6 shows the consumption of hospital and community health services for males
and females. This example illustrates the different profiles for males and females related to
their different life expectancies. In the case of males around 41/2 per cent of total hospital and
community health services spending (on males) is spent on births. The respective share for
females is slightly lower at 31/2 per cent. This is not because the average birth is more costly
for males than for females, but because females have a higher life expectancy than males (and
the absolute number of females therefore exceeds that of males at higher ages) so that older
female cohorts absorb a larger share of total health spending on females than male cohorts of
total health spending on males. For example, males aged 90 consume around 2 per cent of
total health spending on males. For females this share is around 21/2 per cent. This means that
there are relatively (but not necessarily absolutely) fewer resources available for females of
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Chart 5.5: Profiles of income tax and incapacity benefits 
(males, per cent of total)
Age
Income Tax Incapacity benefitsASSUMPTIONS
5.24 With these profiles it is possible to derive the per capita contribution or allocation as a
share of total revenue or total spending on the different revenue and spending items (as taken
from the 2002 Pre-Budget Report), and to transform this into money terms.
5.25 For this, information is required on the number of males and females in every cohort,
and the total money amount for the revenue or spending item. Take the case of income tax
presented above. In 2001-02 income tax amounted to around £108 billion. Around three-
quarters of this was paid by males. Income tax paid by males was therefore around £80 billion.
As can be seen from Chart 5.5, males aged between 30 years and 50 years paid most of the
income tax paid by males, with every cohort contributing around 21/2 per cent of income tax
paid by males. This means that males aged 40 years, for example, paid around £2 billion in
income tax. GAD’s 2001-based interim population projections show that there were roughly
450,000 males aged 40 in 2001. This means that every male aged 40 paid – on average –
roughly £4,500 of income tax in 2001.
5.26 The generational accounts method calculates per capita contributions and allocations
for all of the different spending and revenue items, using the spending and revenue profiles
and information on total spending and revenue from HM Treasury’s medium-term forecasts.
Where  appropriate,  the  generational  accounts  raise  the  per  capita  contributions  and
allocations  in  line  with  productivity  gains  over  the  projection  horizon. These  per  capita
contributions  are  then  combined  with  detailed  population  projections  (as  for  example
illustrated by Chart 5.2) to generate spending and revenue projections. These projections can
then be used to calculate the indicators discussed in Chapter 4.
5.27 However, there are a number of spending and revenue items that will be affected not
only by demographic changes in the future, but also the long-term consequences of current
policies  and  other  factors.  The  basic  state  pension  is  one  example,  with  rising  female
participation rates, everything else equal, leading to higher pension spending in the future.
Just taking account of the demographic effects would not pick up these developments. Social
security spending is most affected by these other factors and has therefore been projected
separately  by  the  Department  for  Work  and  Pensions,  and  the  Government  Actuary’s
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Chart 5.6: Profiles of consumption of hospital and community 







5.28 The  second  exception  is  that  of  long-term  care  spending.  As  argued  in  Chapter  3
(paragraphs  3.17  and  3.18),  compression  of  morbidity  is  likely  to  dampen  the
impact  of  ageing  on  long-term  care  expenditure.  This  Report  assumes  that  long-term
care  spending  remains  constant  as  a  share  of  GDP  from  2007-08  onwards  (Chapter  6,
Chart 6.8). Although a compression of morbidity effect might also be expected to moderate
health spending, no assumption for this is allowed for in these projections, in part because
this issue is less well-researched.
CONCLUSIONS
5.29 This chapter presented the assumptions used in the Report’s assessment of long-term
fiscal sustainability. They are for:
• demography: GAD’s 2001-based interim principal population projections for
the UK;
• employment: the employment rate is held constant after the medium-term
forecast;
• productivity: 2 per cent per year as the baseline case, with 13/4 per cent per
year and 21/4 per cent per year as alternative scenarios;
• GDP: assumed to grow in line with projected employment and productivity
growth rates;
• discount rate: assumed to be 21/2 per cent, 3 per cent and 31/2 per cent; and
• spending  and  revenue: are  consistent  with  HM  Treasury’s  medium-term
forecast and are assumed to follow the age profiles calculated by the NIESR




6.1 This chapter presents the results of the Long-Term Public Finance Report. Following
the different approaches outlined in Chapter 4 the results are presented in terms of: bottom-
up  projections;  updated  illustrative  long-term  fiscal  projections  as  in  Annex  A  of  the
Economic and Fiscal Strategy Report (EFSR); fiscal gaps; and generational accounting. The
bottom-up projections highlight spending on education, pensions, and health and long-
term care, which account for around half of total public spending.
6.2 The results illustrate the impact of making different assumptions about productivity
growth  and  discount/interest  rates.  Limitations  of  the  projections  are  also  discussed,
including  the  treatment  of  government  investment,  the  likely  positive  impact  of  funded
pensions  on  projected  tax  receipts,  and  the  possibility  of  a  moderating  effect  on  health
spending arising from a compression of morbidity
1.
6.3 Finally the results are compared with those of other long-term studies in the UK and
other developed countries.
6.4 The  analysis  in  this  Report  assumes,  for  modelling  purposes,  that  taxation  and
spending policies at the end of the medium-term forecast are continued into the future. This
does not mean that changes to future Budgets are fixed. Instead, changes are dependent on
the results of future spending reviews.
ANALYSIS OF REVENUES AND SPENDING
6.5 This  section  presents  the  results  of  the  revenue  and  spending  projections  on  the
baseline assumption of 2 per cent productivity growth per year.
Revenue projections
6.6 Chart 6.1 shows that total revenue is projected to fall marginally as a share of GDP over
the next 50 years. However, the projections presented here do not pick up all the potential
developments on the revenue side that can be expected. In fact, there are several reasons why
total revenue may rise as a share of GDP without a change in policy. First, the number of
pensioners with significant pension entitlements is expected to increase over the coming
decades. While contributions to pension schemes are tax exempt (up to generous limits), the
future income stream that a funded pension generates is taxed. There is evidence that such
policy could have a significant upward effect on revenue in countries with well-established
funded pension systems.
1 The increase in the number of years people enjoy in good health that accompanies a continued rise in life expectancy.
See Chapter 3 for more details.RESULTS
40
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6.7 A study by the Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis, for example, projects
that total tax revenue from pension income will rise by around 5 percentage points between
2001 and 2040 in the Netherlands
2. The same study argues that: “An important factor that
alleviates the burden of ageing is the pension system, which features a large funded second
pillar of occupational pensions. The Netherlands (together with the UK) has by far the largest
amount of pension fund assets in EU countries. The fiscal treatment of retirement savings in
the Netherlands turns out to be highly favourable for future public finances…”
3. The UK
treatment of retirement savings is in principle similar to that in the Netherlands and a similar
upward tendency of receipts relative to the projections presented here might be expected on
the assumption of an unchanged tax system.
6.8 Second,  even  with  unchanged  indirect  and  direct  tax  rates,  and  tax
allowances/thresholds indexed for inflation, real fiscal drag will tend to push up revenue due
to economic growth. For example, a reasonable long-term assumption is that real earnings
will increase in line with productivity growth. The revenue projections presented here are
therefore  probably  on  the  low  side  or  at  least  should  be  interpreted  as  assuming  a
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Chart 6.1: Total revenue
Source: HM Treasury.
2 Ageing in the Netherlands: a manageable problem, Harry ter Rele, et al, 2000.
3 Ageing in the Netherlands: a manageable problem, Harry ter Rele, et al, 2000, page 21.41
Spending projections
6.9 Total spending (including gross investment) is projected to rise slightly from 381/2 per
cent of GDP in 2001-02 to around 401/2 per cent by 2011-12, then drop marginally before
stabilising around 403/4 per cent of GDP in later decades. As such, total spending is projected
to be very similar in 2051-52 as in 2007-08. The evolution of total spending as a share of GDP
is shown in Chart 6.2.
Individual spending projections
6.10 Chart 6.3 shows that education spending is projected to remain relatively stable over
the coming decades, fluctuating around 51/2 per cent of GDP. This reflects the fact that the
number of people of education age (either in schools, higher education or further education)
is projected to vary only slightly. As stated in Chapter 5, these projections take no account of
policy  developments  or  other  changes  in  the  future,  such  as  potential  future  changes  in
participation rates in higher and further education. The increase between 2001-02 and 2011-
12 reflects the substantial increase in education spending announced in the 2002 Spending
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Chart 6.3: Education spending
Source: HM Treasury.RESULTS
6.11 Chart 6.4 compares projected education spending in the UK with a number of OECD
countries.
6.12 Chart 6.5 shows that public pension spending
4 is likely to remain relatively stable over
the next 50 years, fluctuating around 5 per cent of GDP. As a share of GDP, pension spending
is projected to be highest around 2031-32, when the number of pensioners is projected to be
increasing at its fastest rate as the 1960s baby-boom generation enters retirement age. The
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Chart 6.4: Education spending in selected OECD countries
United States Norway Belgium Netherlands Australia Denmark UK Canada
Sources: OECD, Fiscal implications of ageing: projections of age-related spending, (2001) and HM Treasury.
2000 2050
4 Public pension spending is defined as the sum of the Retirement pension, including the Second State Pension, Minimum
Income Guarantee and Pension Credit, Winter Fuel Payments, Over 75 TV licenses, and Christmas Bonus.
5 The Pension Credit: long-term projections, Department for Work and Pensions, 2002.
Pensions43
6.13 The pension projections differ in a number of ways from earlier long-term pension
projections  for  the  UK.  The  main  differences  relative  to  the  most  recent  UK  pension
projections, produced by HM Treasury in the context of the European Union’s Economic
Policy Committee (EPC), are that slightly different employment rate and productivity growth
assumptions  are  used,  and  demographic  trends  are  based  on  GAD’s  latest  2001-interim
principal population projections rather than on earlier population projections provided by
Eurostat.
6.14 In  addition,  HM Treasury’s  projections  conducted  for  the  EPC  exercise  were  on  a
definition of public pensions comprising the National Insurance Fund and the Minimum
Income Guarantee, whereas the projections presented in this Report are based on a narrower
definition of public spending on pensions and so the projections – in terms of GDP – are
correspondingly lower
6.
6.15 Despite these differences the broad conclusions remain unchanged: public spending
on pensions, as a share of GDP, is projected to remain fairly constant in the face of an ageing
population. Chart 6.6 shows that this contrasts with the substantial increases expected in
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Chart 6.5: Pension spending
Source: HM Treasury.
6 For the different definitions, see Footnote 4 and, for the HM Treasury’s EPC projections, 
http://www.hm-treasury.gov.UK/Documents/UK_Economy/Fiscal_Policy.RESULTS
6.16 The  health  projections  build  in  the  substantial  medium-term  increases  in  health
spending announced in Budget 2002 in response to the Wanless Review. Health spending as
a proportion of GDP is projected to rise from around 61/2 per cent in 2001-02 to around 93/4
per cent by 2051-52 as shown in Chart 6.7. Of this, an increase of roughly 11/2 percentage
points of GDP by 2007-08 reflects the substantial increase in NHS spending announced in
Budget 2002 in response to the Wanless Review. The further increase from 2008-09 is driven
by demographic changes.
6.17 However, the pure demographic effect on health spending is likely to be less marked
than shown in these projections. This is because higher life expectancy generally goes hand
in hand with a rise in the number of years enjoyed in good health. This trend, which is





7 See also Demand for long-term care in the UK: projections of long-term care finance for older people to 2051, 
Raphael Wittenberg, Ruth Hancock, Adelina Comas-Herrera and Linda Pickard, in A New Contract for Retirement:
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Source: HM Treasury.
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Chart 6.6: Pension spending in selected EU countries
Note: UK figures are taken from Chart 6.5 of this Report and are for 2001-02 and 2051-52 respectively.
Sources: Table 3.5, EPC Working Group on Ageing, (2001) and HM Treasury.





6.18 This trend is likely to have a marked dampening effect on health spending growth. The
Wanless Review, for example, assumed in two of its three scenarios that the compression of
morbidity would lead to a fall in demand for health services and products of between 5 and
10  per  cent  between  now  and  2022  for  those  aged  65  years  and  over.  Alongside  the
compression of morbidity, the Wanless Review also modelled changes in preferences and
expectations, and technological advances. Future decisions on implementing the Wanless
recommendations after 2008 are a matter for future spending reviews.
6.19 Compared  with  HM  Treasury’s  health  projections  produced  for  the  EPC
8,  the
projections presented here show a more pronounced increase in health spending as a share
of GDP over the next 50 years. While the underlying economic and demographic assumptions
are different (see above in the context of pension spending), the difference mainly reflects the
substantial increase in funding to the NHS announced in Budget 2002 up to 2007-08. The EPC
projections did not include these increases and therefore started from a lower initial point at
the end of the medium-term forecast period.
6.20 The  EPC  report  also  presented  long-term  care  spending  allowing  for  the  effect  of
compression  of  morbidity.  A  gradual  increase  in  healthy  life  was  modelled  in  a  variant
scenario by assuming someone, say, aged 75 would require the same amount of long-term
care in 2050 as someone five years younger nowadays. This assumption made a marked
difference to the results, with long-term care spending projected to remain more or less stable
over the next 50 years in the UK. By comparison, in the unchanged healthy-life scenario, long-
term  care  spending  was  projected  to  rise  by  nearly  50  per  cent  by  2050. This  finding  is
confirmed by other research
9. As stated in Chapter 5, the projections in this Report assume a
similar compression of morbidity effect for long-term care (while no allowance for this effect
is made for health spending). This means that long-term care spending is held at around 11/4
per cent of GDP (the 2007-08 level) rather than rising to 13/4 per cent by 2051-52 as it would if
compression of morbidity were not allowed for. Chart 6.8 shows the evolution of long-term




8 Budgetary Challenges Posed by an Ageing Population, EPC Working Group on Ageing, November 2001.
9 Demand for long-term care in the UK: projections of long-term care finance for older people to 2051, Raphael Wittenberg, 
Ruth Hancock, Adelina Comas-Herrera and Linda Pickard, in A New Contract for Retirement: Modelling Policy Options to
2050, edited by Richard Brooks, Sue Regan and Peter Robinson, 2002.RESULTS
6.21 Compared with the long-term care projections produced by HM Treasury for the EPC,
these results are slightly lower. This is because part of long-term care is under health spending
in this Report where no compression of morbidity is assumed. In the EPC projections, long-
term care spending was defined as the sum of NHS spending on long-term care and spending
on personal social services
10.
6.22 Spending on education, pensions, and health and long-term care amounted to roughly
45 per cent of total government spending in 2001-02. This share is projected to rise to around
50 per cent by 2051-52. In terms of GDP, the total of education, pension, and health and long-
term care spending is projected to be around 211/2 per cent by 2051-52. The evolution of other
spending is shown in Chart 6.9. The gradual decline between 2001-02 and 2021-22 largely
reflects the assumption that most non-pension social transfers (which represent nearly a
third of other spending) will rise in line with prices after 2007-08, reducing their share in GDP.
Other spending also includes public sector occupational pensions, which remains small as a
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10 The health projections in this Report are therefore correspondingly higher than in the excersise coordinated by the EPC.6.23 Table 6.1 shows that the changing demographic structure of the UK’s population – and
especially the ageing aspect – is expected to have only a limited impact on the public finances
over the coming decades. This contrasts with the findings in many other developed countries,
where the spending pressures are much greater. Spending on education and pensions is
projected to remain more or less stable as a share of GDP after the end of the medium-term
forecast. The  most  marked  increase  is  projected  in  health  spending.  Health  spending  is
projected, based on the assumptions in this report, to rise from 81/4 per cent of GDP in 2007-
08 to 93/4 per cent by 2051-52. Overall spending is projected to increase slightly, as a share of
GDP,  over  the  next  30  years  and  then  fall  back.  So  total  spending,  as  a  share  of  GDP,  is
projected to be very similar in 2051-52 as in 2007-08. The substantial increase in spending
between 2001-02 and 2007-08 largely reflects the Government’s increased spending on public
services, in particular, on health and education.
Table 6.1: Spending projections
per cent of GDP
Year 2001-02 2011-12 2021-22 2031-32 2041-42 2051-52
Pensions
1 5.0 5.0 4.8 5.2 5.0 4.8
Health
2 6.3 8.2 8.5 9.3 9.7 9.8
Education 4.6 5.9 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.7
Long-term care
3,4 0.9 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2 1.2
Total age-related spending 16.9 20.3 21.1 21.4 21.7 21.5
Other spending 21.7 20.3 19.6 20.0 19.8 19.3
Total spending
5 38.6 40.6 39.6 41.4 41.5 40.8
1 Defined as the sum of the Retirement pension, including the State Second Pension, Minimum Income Guarantee and Pension Credit, over 75 TV licences, and Christmas Bonus. 
2 Gross NHS spending.
3 Compression of morbidity assumed.
4 Excluding long-term care provided within the NHS which is accounted for under Health (for which no compression of morbidity is assumed).
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Chart 6.9: Other spending
Per cent of GDP
Source: HM Treasury.
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ANALYSIS OF THE LONG-TERM FISCAL POSITION
6.24 As discussed above, total revenue is projected to fall marginally as a share of GDP, while
spending is projected to rise slightly over the next few decades and then fall back again as a
result of demographic changes. Chart 6.10 shows that, as a result, the primary balance moves
from surplus to deficit and then back to surplus again over the next 70 years. 
6.25 As discussed in Chapter 4, there are a variety of approaches to assessing long-term
fiscal sustainability. What matters from the Government’s perspective is keeping within the
fiscal rules as discussed in Chapter 2. However, it is worth emphasising that the Government
aims to meet the fiscal rules over the cycle. It does not make sense to try to set fiscal policy
now to meet the fiscal rules exactly over the next 50-100 years – the uncertainties are simply
too great. The purpose of this Report is to look ahead beyond the normal medium-term
horizon to ensure that current Government policies remain sustainable in the long run.
6.26 A  common  starting  point  for  thinking  about  long-term  fiscal  sustainability  is  to
consider a sustainable debt to GDP ratio. Indeed, the Government’s sustainable investment
rule is based on this idea. The sustainable investment rule states that public sector net debt
will be held at a stable and prudent level over the cycle, and that, other things equal, net debt
will be maintained below 40 per cent of GDP over the economic cycle.
Updated illustrative long-term fiscal projections
6.27 Annex  A  of  the  2002  EFSR,  published  in  Budget  2002,  showed  that  the  UK’s  public
finances  are  broadly  sustainable  in  the  long  term.  Moreover,  Annex  A  of  the  2002  EFSR
showed that:
• current public consumption can grow slightly faster than GDP growth in the
long run, while meeting the Government’s golden rule;
• public sector net investment can grow close to the economy’s growth rate over
the projection period, without jeopardising the sustainable investment rule;
and
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Chart 6.10: Primary balance





6.28 These  conclusions  are  firmly  supported  by  updated  illustrative  the  long-term  fiscal
projections, which are based on the medium-term forecast as presented in 2002 Pre-Budget
Report.  Except  for  the  updated  medium-term  forecast,  the  same  assumptions  as  for  the
baseline projections in Annex A of Budget 2002 are used
11. The main assumptions are:
• productivity growth of 2 per cent per year between 2007-08 and 2011-12, and
of 13/4 per cent per year from 2012-13 onwards;
• employment growth of 1/4per cent per year between 2007-08 and 2011-12, and
of 0 per cent per year from 2012-13 onwards; and
• public sector net investment equivalent to 21/4 per cent of GDP up to 2011-12
and then 1.8 per cent of GDP; and
• tax  revenues  and  current  spending  grow  in  line  with  GDP  from  2008-09
onwards and are the same, in other words the current budget is in balance
(and hence the golden rule is met).
6.29 The  updated  illustrative  long-term  fiscal  projections  based  on  the  medium-term
forecast presented in the, 2002 Pre-Budget Report are shown in Chart 6.11. They show a very
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Chart 6.11: Updated illustrative long-term fiscal projections
1
2001-02 2007-08 2011-12 2021-22 2031-32
1Medium-term projections as in the 2002 Pre-Budget Report.
Per cent of GDP
11  See Budget 2002 The strength to make long-term decisions: Investing in an enterprising, fairer Britain, HM Treasury, April
2002, page 147.RESULTS
6.30 Transfers as a share of GDP are projected to remain relatively stable between 2007-08
and 2031-32 as the increase in debt interest payments is more or less offset by relatively lower
other transfers such as non-pension social benefits.
6.31 Current consumption is projected to rise from 19.8 per cent of GDP in 2001-02 to just
above 21 per cent of GDP by 2007-08 and to rise marginally further thereafter. This relative
expansion reflects the fact that current consumption can grow at a slightly faster average
annual rate than GDP while still meeting the fiscal rules.
6.32 Using  the  stated  assumptions  and  modelling  approach,  the  net  debt  to  GDP  ratio
remains below 40 per cent over the entire projection horizon, implying that the sustainable
investment rule is met. The projected changes in net debt mainly reflect the higher ratio of
public investment to GDP up to 2011-12.
6.33 With the results of the updated illustrative long-term fiscal projections only marginally
different from those presented in Annex A of Budget 2002, the conclusions drawn earlier
remain valid: the UK’s public finances are broadly sustainable over the long term. Consistent
with meeting the golden rule, current consumption can grow slightly faster than GDP in the
projections, providing the resources to meet future spending needs; for example, to meet the
health care needs of an ageing population. Furthermore, public sector net investment can
grow more or less in line with the economy without jeopardising the sustainable investment
rule. Net debt is projected to remain below 40 per cent of GDP in the long run.
Fiscal gaps
6.34 The fiscal gap concept introduced in Chaper 4 also takes a sustainable debt to GDP ratio
as a starting point for thinking about long-term fiscal sustainability. The fiscal gap measure
represents the change in the primary balance needed to attain a particular debt target at a
particular point in time. A negative fiscal gap, for example, implies that the Government could
loosen fiscal policy while still attaining a particular debt level in the future. Taking the 40 per
cent net debt to GDP level from the sustainable investment rule as the target, it is therefore
possible to use the fiscal gap concept to estimate the primary balance that is consistent with
the sustainable investment rule, over different time horizons
12.
6.35 Tables 6.2 to 6.4 show the fiscal gaps under a variety of scenarios, where the change in
the primary balance is assumed to occur from 2008-09 on, that is beyond the medium-term
horizon  for  fiscal  policy
13.  Table  6.2  shows  the  baseline  projections  under  a  variety  of
assumptions about the real interest rate on debt interest. As discussed in Chapter 5, there is
currently quite a difference between the discount rate assumed in the Green Book, 31/2 per
cent, and the real interest rate on long–term UK government debt, which is currently closer
to 21/4 per cent. Given that long-term real interest rates have averaged less than 21/2 per cent
since 2000, there is a strong case for using the lower rates. Table 6.2 illustrates the sensitivity
of the results to changes in the interest rate assumption.
6
12 It should be noted that this Report focuses on the general government rather than on the public sector, while the
Government’s fiscal rules apply to the public sector. However, the difference is small.
13 Obviously if the change in the primary balance were assumed to be in 2003-04 instead of 2008-09 then the implied





faster than GDPTable 6.2: Fiscal gaps
1 in baseline scenario with 2 per cent productivity growth 
(per cent of GDP) 





2 –11/4 –1 –3/4
2021–22 –3/4 –1/2 –1/2
2031–32 –0 1/4 1/4
2041–42 1/2 1/2 3/4
2051–52 3/4 3/4 1
1 Change to primary balance needed to attain a net debt target of 40 per cent of GDP in the year shown. Rounded to the nearest quarter percentage point.
2 Net debt target is reached at end of the year specified.
6.36 The results show that the UK public finances are in a strong long-term position. Table
6.2 shows that the Government could reduce its primary balance if it aimed for a net debt to
GDP ratio of 40 per cent by 2021-22 in the baseline case. If the horizon is extended, the
Government would have to tighten fiscal policy only slightly to ensure that net debt stays at
40 per cent of GDP . Table 6.2 also shows that the Governmnent could loosen fiscal policy by
slightly more (or tighten by slightly less) the lower the assumed interest rate. It should also be
emphasised that all the numbers in Table 6.2 are small (representing around 1 percentage
point of GDP or less). This needs to be seen in the context of an average absolute forecasting
error on the year-ahead forecast on public sector net borrowing of 1 per cent of GDP since
1989-90
14. 
6.37 Tables  6.3  and  6.4  illustrate  the  effect  of  assuming  lower  and  higher  productivity
growth respectively than in the baseline scenario. In this context it should be noted that HM
Treasury  recently  found  that  there  were  clear  upside  risks  to  productivity  growth  in  the
medium term
15, indeed on current estimates, output per hour has averaged around 21/4 per
cent  between  the  on-trend  points  in  1997  and  2001
16.  Tables  6.3  and  6.4  show  that  the
Government needs to change the primary balance only slightly (if at all) to ensure that net
debt would stay at 40 per cent of GDP in the future. In the higher productivity growth scenario
with a 3 per cent interest rate, for example, the Government could loosen fiscal policy if it
aimed for a net debt to GDP ratio of 40 per cent by 2021-22, leave policy unchanged for 
2031-32  and  tighten  only  slightly  for  longer  time  horizons. The  main  impact  of  making
different productivity assumptions is to change the rate at which most non-pension social
transfers  (uprated  in  line  with  prices)  move  in  relation  to  earnings.  A  faster  rate  of
productivity growth implies that price-indexed benefits grow more slowly relative to GDP and
hence suggest an even stronger fiscal position. 
Table 6.3: Fiscal gaps
1 in lower productivity scenario with 1
3⁄4 per cent productivity growth
(per cent of GDP)




2 –1 –1 –3/4
2021–22 –3/4 –1/2 –1/4
2031–32 0 1/4 1/2
2041–42 1/2 3/4 1
2051–52 11 1 1/4
1 Change to primary balance needed to attain a net debt target of 40 per cent of GDP in the year shown. Rounded to the nearest quarter percentage point.
2 Net debt target is reached at end of the year specified.
RESULTS 6
14 End of Year Fiscal Report, HM Treasury, November 2002.
15 See Trend Growth: Recent Developments and Prospects, HM Treasury, April 2002.
16 See 2002 Pre-Budget Report, HM Treasury, November 2002.
51RESULTS
Table 6.4: Fiscal gaps
1 in higher productivity scenario with 2
1⁄4 per cent productivity growth
(per cent of GDP)





2 –11/4 –11/4 –1
2021–22 –1 –3/4 –1/2
2031–32 –1/4 0 1/4
2041–42 1/4 1/2 1/2
2051–52 1/2 3/4 3/4
1 Change to primary balance needed to attain a net debt target of 40 per cent of GDP in the year shown. Rounded to the nearest quarter percentage point.
2 Net debt target is reached at end of the year specified.
6.38 It is worth pointing out that lower long-term interest rates are likely to be associated
with a low growth rather than high growth rate. Correspondingly, it is also likely that higher
interest rates will prevail in a high growth economic environment.
Generational Accounts
6.39 Chapter  4  also  introduced  the  concepts  of  intertemporal  and  inter-generational
balances. Table  6.5  presents  estimates  of  the  intertemporal  budget  gap  under  a  range  of
assumptions about the discount rate, that is the increase/reduction in tax revenues as share of
GDP in 2001-02 (and a proportionate increase/reduction thereafter) to meet the intertemporal
balance condition. A positive gap means that the Government would have to raise taxes (or
lower spending) to establish intertemporal balance. As for the fiscal gap calculations, these
numbers  need  to  be  interpreted  carefully.  As  noted  in  Chapter  4  (paragraph  4.12)  the
intertemporal balance concept is an overly-stringent condition for long-term sustainability in
the sense that at the end of the assumed projection horizon (100 years here) all government
debt  is  repaid.  However,  fiscal  sustainability  does  not  require  zero  debt.  Indeed,  the
sustainable investment rule states that public sector net debt should be maintained below 40
per cent of GDP over the economic cycle. Nevertheless, it is a useful indicator that can be
monitored over time and can be compared with previous international studies and those by
the National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) for the UK
17.
6.40 The NIESR calculated the UK’s generational accounts for 1998 and 2001. Both studies
concluded that the UK faced only a modest generational imbalance and that the public finances
were broadly sustainable in the long run. The results presented in this report are qualitatively
similar to those calculated earlier even though slightly different assumptions are used.
6.41 Table 6.5 presents the same variants as Tables 6.2 to 6.4 for the intertemporal balance.
The  results  show  that  whether  revenues/spending  need  to  change  at  all  to  maintain
intertemporal balance depends entirely on the discount rate assumption. If a low discount
rate is used, as could be justified by the low real interest rate on long-term UK government
bonds, the condition for intertemporal balance is met or exceeded in each case regardless of
the productivity assumption.
Table 6.5: Intertemporal budget gaps
1
(per cent of GDP) 
Discount rate (per cent) 21/2 33
1/2
Scenario
Lower productivity (13/4 per cent) 0 1 13/4
Baseline (2 per cent) –1 1/2 11/4
Higher productivity (21/4 per cent) –2 –1/4 3/4
1 Tax increase (or decrease) in 2001-02 and a permanent, proportionate tax increase (or decrease) thereafter needed to ensure intertemporal balance.
Rounded to the nearest quarter percentage point.
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17 See Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, NIESR, 1998 and




Box 6.2: Inter-generational balance
The  generational  accounting  framework  also  provides  a  measure  of  inter-generational
equity, the inter-generational balance gap (IGG). There is no unique measure of inter-
generational  fairness,  however.  For  example,  debt  sustainability  with  a  constant  tax
burden  is  another  useful  indicator.  Another  way  of  thinking  about  inter-generational
fairness is in terms of the golden rule which ensures that over the cycle the Government
only borrows to invest and not to fund current spending.
By  comparison  with  the  golden  rule,  the  IGG  probably  understates  the  degree  of
generational  fairness  as  it  does  not  distinguish  between  current  consumption  and
investment in that investment is allocated to the generation in which the spending takes
place. Clearly government investment can provide a flow of services for a very long period
of  time  benefiting  not  just  this  generation  but  also  future  generations.  Buildings  and
infrastructures  are  obvious  examples
1,2.  This  suggests  that  firm  conclusions  on  inter-
generational balance should not be drawn from the IGG measure presented in Table 6.6,
especially not from the absolute values. The concept does, however, provide a benchmark
that can be assessed over time and between countries. It may also serve as a basis for
improved measures in the future.
Table 6.6: Inter-generational balance gap in baseline scenario
1
(per cent of GDP)
Discount rate (per cent) 21/2 33
1/2
Scenario
Baseline (2 per cent) 2 21/4 21/2
1 Tax increase (or decrease) in 2001-02 and a permanent, proportionate tax increase (or decrease) thereafter to ensure the net lifetime tax burden
on current newborns is equal to that of future newborns.
Table 6.6 shows that the Government would have to raise taxes (or lower spending) only
slightly to close the inter-generational balance gap. These results must be seen in the
context of an average absolute forecasting error of 1 per cent since 1989-90 on the year-
ahead forecast of public sector net borrowing.
The results confirm earlier studies and other indicators which suggest that there is a high
degree of inter-generational fairness with respect to future generations. However, the
results were found to be very sensitive to the assumptions about productivity growth and
the discount rate, and only the baseline scenario is presented in Table 6.6.
As noted, one drawback of the inter-generational gap measure is that it takes no account
of  the  benefits  of  government  investment  to  future  generations.  Chart  6.12  below
illustrates the projected evolution of general government net investment as a share of
GDP in the coming decades
3. As can be seen net investment as a share of GDP is projected
to  rise  substantially  between  2001-02  and  2011-12.  This  is  mainly  the  result  of  the
substantial  increases  in  investment  spending  announced  in  Budget  2002  and  earlier
budgets. These investments will benefit the current and future generations. From the end
of  the  medium-term  forecast  period,  net  investment  is  projected  to  remain  relatively
stable as a share of GDP at around 21/2 per cent. 
1 The intertemporal balance concept is not affected by this distinction, although in principle sustainability could be
affected by the mix of spending, for instance where the mix affects the economy’s productivity growth rate.
Chapter 4, Box 4.2 provides more details.
2 To obtain a more realistic assessment of the degree of generational fairness of current policy, the generational
accounts should treat current consumption and investment differently. HM Treasury is currently studying ways to
modify the existing generational accounts framework to allow for this, Box 4.2 in Chapter 4 illustrates some of the
issues involved.
3 As stated earlier, this refers to the general government and not the public sector. Net investment of the generational
government generally exceeds that of the public sector by a small margin.RESULTS
6.42 The results demonstrate that the UK public finances are sustainable in the long term
and that the UK is in a strong position to face the fiscal challenges of an ageing population.
They confirm earlier findings as presented in Annex A of the EFSR and also those of NIESR
18.
The projections in this report by no means represent what the Government intends to do over
the next 50 to 100 years, rather they illustrate the long-term implications of continuing with
current policies. Nevertheless, the indicators show that, on a range of cautious and plausible
assumptions,  the  UK  public  finances  are  sustainable.  Even  in  the  variants  where  some
adjustment is implied, it is small and well within the margins of error of such projections.
6.43 The sustainability indicators also suggest a high degree of inter-generational fairness
in  the  sense  that  spending  trends  can  be  sustained  with  a  roughly  constant  tax  burden
without increasing the debt burden relative to GDP over time. This finding is also supported
by the inter-generational balance indicators (Box 6.2), although this measure is found to be
sensitive to the precise assumptions used, and important deficiencies in its treatment of
investment were noted.
6.44 To  obtain  a  better  perspective  of  just  how  sustainable  the  UK  position,  is  it  is
instructive to compare the results for the UK with studies for other developed countries. This
is considered in the next section.
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Chart 6.12: Net investment
Source: HM Treasury.
18 Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, NIESR, 1998 and NIESR







6.45 International comparisons show that the UK’s fiscal position is also relatively strong
compared with other developed countries facing similar challenges from ageing populations.
Table  6.13  shows  the  percentage  change  in  taxes  required  to  establish  inter-generational
balance in a number of developed countries
19. While not directly comparable with the results
presented in this report, it shows that current policy in the UK has a substantially higher
degree  of  inter-generational  fairness  than  many  other  developed  countries. The  UK  also
compares favourably to the United States. The authors conclude that: “It is evident that if the
government is able to keep to these tight fiscal constraints, then the UK fiscal position is
considerably brighter than most other developed nations’”
20. 
6.46 The OECD have also projected that the overall increase in age-related spending (such as
education, pensions and health care) in the UK is likely to be moderate compared with those
expected in other developed countries. In 2001 the OECD published a detailed study on the
fiscal implications of ageing in OECD member states
21. Under the assumption of unchanged
policies, the OECD projected that public pension spending as a share of GDP for all OECD
countries will rise by an average of nearly 4 percentage points between 2000 and 2050. In a
number of countries, the projected increase is even greater, reaching 8 percentage points.
6.47 The same study showed that total age-related spending (which the OECD defines as
the  sum  of  old-age  and  early  retirement  pensions,  health  and  long-term  care,  and
child/family benefits and education) would increase by nearly 6 percentage points on average
in OECD member states over the next 50 years. Alongside old-age pensions, the main upward
pressure was projected to come from health and long-term care spending. This Report shows
that health spending is likely to put the most pressure on the public finances in the UK, with
public pension spending projected to remain relatively stable as a share of GDP. Overall
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Chart 6.13: International comparison of inter-generational
balance
Percentage change in taxes required to achieve generational balance
Source: Cardarelli, Sefton and Kotlikoff, 2000.
19 Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Economic Journal, 2000.
20 Generational accounting in the UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Economic Journal, 2000,
page F570.
21 Fiscal implications of ageing: Projections of age-related spending, in OECD Economic Outlook, OECD, June 2001.RESULTS
6.48 The EPC’s Working Group on Ageing (see paragraph 2.17) was closely involved in the
OECD exercise. The EPC’s own projections on pensions, and health and long-term care costs
were based on different assumptions and definitions, but present a similar picture. Based on
policy  in  place  or  legislated  for  at  the  time  of  the  exercise  in  mid-2000,  public  pension
spending in EU member states was projected to rise from an average of 10.4 per cent of GDP
in 2000 to 13.6 per cent by 2040 – the decade in which the ageing process is likely to put the
most  pressure  on  the  public  finances  in  European  countries. The  UK  was  one  of  a  few
countries for which public pension spending as a share of GDP was not projected to rise
markedly over that time (Chart 6.6). The working group’s projections on health and long-term
care were also qualitatively similar to those published by the OECD.
6.49 As a result of the ageing process, the primary balance is predicted to deteriorate in
most OECD member states. In the above-mentioned study, the OECD projected that the
deterioration  will  average  6.8  percentage  points  between  2000  and  2050,  with  the  range
varying from an increase of 1 percentage point in Poland to a deterioration of 17 percentage
points  in  Norway.  In  an  international  context  the  projected  deterioration  of  the  primary
balance in the UK up to 2031-32 is therefore extremely modest. Furthermore, as stated above,
the trend is also projected to be reversed by around 2031-32.
CONCLUSIONS
6.50 The Report updates the illustrative long-term fiscal projections presented in Annex A
of the EFSR and confirms the results given in Budget 2002. Given the projected profile for tax
revenue and transfers, current consumption can grow slightly faster than GDP growth in the
long  run  while  meeting  the  Government’s  golden  rule.  In  addition,  public  sector  net
investment can grow close to the economy’s growth rate over the projection period without
jeopardising the sustainable investment rule and the net debt to GDP ratio is projected to
remain below 40 per cent in the long run.
6.51 The  Report  also  presents  a  series  of  additional  indicators,  including  measures  of:
bottom-up projections, fiscal gaps and generational accounting. These confirm the results of
the Annex A-style projections and of earlier studies that the UK fiscal position is sustainable
in the long term on the basis of current policies and that the UK is in a strong position relative
to many other developed countries. The Report also finds that there is a high degree of inter-
generational  fairness;  particularly  so  when  account  is  taken  of  the  increase  in  public
investment that has been announced and which will provide benefits for both current and
future generations.
6.52 The indicators used in this Report do not supplant the fiscal rules which govern the
Government’s  fiscal  policy.  What  the  Report  does  show,  using  a  range  of  established
indicators, is that on plausible assumptions the UK public finances are sustainable in the
longer term.
6.53 The  uncertainties  involved  in  projecting  so  far  ahead  are  enormous.  Besides  the
sensitivity  to  discount/interest  rates  and  productivity  growth,  which  are  illustrated,  the
Report notes a number of important qualifications including the uncertainty about long-
term trends in: health spending, tax revenues, and employment.
6.54 The Long-Term Public Finance Report along with the End of Year Fiscal Report mark a
major development of the UK’s fiscal framework. In particular, they provide substantially
more transparency and detailed analysis on both the distant future and the recent past. Both
are intended to provide further reassurance that the tough decisions made in the past have
put the UK in a secure position to face the challenges of the future without resorting to






INTERTEMPORAL BUDGET CONSTRAINT AND FISCAL
SUSTAINABILITY
A.1 The intertemporal budget constraint (IBC) was described in Chapter 4 as
∑
s=t




Ss(1+r)–s+t + D  (1)
where Rs is revenue in year s, Ss is spending in year s, r is the discount rate, t is the current
year and D is the initial stock of net debt.
A.2 We can also define the level of primary balance in year s PBs to equal Rs–Ss so that the





PBs (1+r)–s+t = 0  (2)
By substituting into the left hand side the current level of debt, and current and (discounted)
projected primary surpluses, the sum is equal to zero if the IBC is satisfied.
A.3 The IBC, in a variety of forms, has been used widely in the analysis of the sustainability








= 0  (3)
where d is the initial debt to GDP ratio, pbs is the primary balance as a share of GDP in year
s, g is the real growth rate of GDP, and r is the discount rate.
A.4 This formulation of the IBC has been used to analyse the level of primary balances
needed to achieve a certain debt target in the future, such as in fiscal gap analysis
1. The fiscal
gap is the immediate and permanent change in the primary balance that is needed in order
that the debt to GDP ratio at time T in the future returns to the level that prevails at the
current time
2.
A.5 The alternative technique of generational accounting looks at the absolute levels of the
primary balance and debt rather than ratios to GDP, that is, equation (2) rather than equation
(3). Equation (2) can be used to calculate whether there is a “gap” in the long-term public
finances.  If  current  and  future  revenues  are  not  sufficient  to  cover  current  and  future
spending and current debt, for a finite period the right hand side of equation (2) will not







A.6 The  generational  accounting  technique  calculates  the  immediate  and  permanent
change in the primary balance that is needed in order that the IBG will equal zero.
1 For more details, see The US fiscal problem: where we are, how we got there, and where we’re going, Alan Auerbach, 1994.
2 As stated in Chapter 4, the formula can be modified so that any debt to GDP ratio can be targeted at time T.
(1+r) []MEASURING INTERTEMPORAL AND INTER-GENERATIONAL BALANCE
A.7 As discussed in Chapter 4, the inter-generational balance gap (IGG) can be used as a
measure of the extent of fiscal adjustment needed to achieve generational balance. The IGG
imposes an additional constraint over and above the intertemporal budget constraint, as the
following discussion will show.
DERIVING THE INTER-GENERATIONAL BALANCE GAP
A.8 The following discussion (and notation) is drawn from Generational accounting in the
UK, Roberto Cardarelli, James Sefton, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff, Economic Journal, 2000.














Rs(1+r)–s+t can be looked at in more detail. The tax revenues to be
collected by the Government can be broken down into two parts: the burden on generations
that are already born, and the burden on future generations. 








Nt,t+s Pt,t+s (1+r)–s (6)
with the first term the burden on current generations, and the second term the burden on
future generations.
A.12 First, the burden on current generations.
Nt,t–s is the present value of the average remaining lifetime net tax (taxes less transfers)
payment of the person born in year t-s, or is aged s years old, at time t. M is the maximum
length of life.
Pt,t–s is the population of the generation born in year t-s at time t.
Therefore, Nt,t–s Pt,t–s represents the future tax burden of the generation born in year t-s, at
time t. Summing across from s=0 to M, the maximum length of life, adds together the tax
burdens of different generations that have already been born.
A.13 Secondly, the burden on future generations.
Nt,t+s is the present value (to the year of birth) of the average lifetime net tax payment of the
person to be born in year t+s, or in s years time.
Because this is only discounted to the year of birth, we need to discount this value s years
back to time t, hence the inclusion of (1+r)–s.
Pt,t+s is the population of the generation born in year t+s, determined in the year of birth.
Therefore, Nt,t+s Pt,t+s (1+r)–s represents the tax burden of a generation to be born in s
years time, at time t. Summing across from s=1 to infinity, adds together the tax burdens of
the generations born every year from now into the infinite future.
58
A59
A.14 Using equations (5) and (6), the intertemporal budget gap can be represented by:













where spending S now only includes government purchases (i.e. transfers are not included).
A.15 If the intertemporal budget gap is equal to zero, this means that future tax collections
will be sufficient to meet future spending and to pay off current debt. This does not mean,
however, that the tax collections will be distributed equally across time. A country that raises
taxes in the future to pay off past debt may still attain an IBG of zero. However, this policy
makes future newborns relatively worse off than current newborns. Similarly, a country that
runs large surpluses today while reducing taxes in the future may still attain an IBG of zero,
but this policy makes current newborns worse off relative to future newborns.
A.16 Inter-generational fairness as defined by the IGG is achieved when current policy treats
current  newborns  and  future  newborns  equally.  The  basis  for  comparison  for  future
newborns  is  current  newborns,  rather  than  all  past  newborns. This  is  because  while  the
Government  today  can  affect  the  lifetime  tax  burden  for  current  newborns  and  future
newborns, it can only partially affect the lifetime tax burden for past newborns or existing
generations. Those who are already born have faced tax regimes in the past, set by past
governments. It would be very difficult for a current Government to change its policies to
offset the effects of policies of past Governments.
A.17 If  current  and  future  newborns  are  to  be  treated  the  same,  then  the  present  value
(discounted to their year of birth) of their average lifetime net tax payments should be the
same, regardless of the year of birth. In the notation introduced above, this means that Nt,t,
the present value of the average lifetime net tax payment of the person born in year t, at time
t, should equal Nt,t+s, the present value of the average lifetime net tax payment of the person
born s years from time t, for all s.
A.18 Therefore the IGG modifies the IBG in equation (7) by restricting Nt,t+s, = Nt,t, to yield:













A.19 Thus equation (8) measures the extent of fiscal adjustment needed today, in order for
future flows of spending and current debt to be financed by tax flows that do not favour one
generation over the other.
A.20 The IGG is defined above in terms of the inter-generational fairness of tax flows, rather
than  spending  flows,  in  that  lifetime  net  tax  payments  are  equalised  between  current
newborns  and  future  newborns.  On  the  spending  side  (excluding  transfers)  it  is  already
assumed that current newborns and future newborns have the same lifetime spending flow
(not including transfers). That is, both current and future newborns are assumed to face the
same (current) spending policies. 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN CURRENT CONSUMPTION AND
INVESTMENT
A.21 As  discussed  in  Chapter  4,  Box  4.2  generational  accounting  does  not  distinguish
between current consumption and investment. A result that shows an inter-generational
imbalance that favours current generations at the cost of future generations is therefore likely
to overstate the degree of imbalance.
MEASURING INTERTEMPORAL AND INTER-GENERATIONAL BALANCE A
Defining inter-
generational
fairnessMEASURING INTERTEMPORAL AND INTER-GENERATIONAL BALANCE
A.22 To  illustrate  the  above  statement  it  is  possible  to  modify  the  example  of  inter-
generational fairness presented in Chapter 4. Consider Country 2. In Chapter 4 it was argued
that policy was generationally unfair as generations 1, 2 and 3 spent more than they raised in
revenue. Policy in Country 2 is generationally unfair as long as spending is entirely in the form
of current consumption.
A.23 By  distinguishing  between  current  consumption  and  investment,  the  result  can  be
changed. Imagine that spending is either in the form of current consumption or investment, and
that investment today has a positive impact on current consumption in the future. Specifically,
assume that investment today has the same positive impact on the next three generations (ignore
depreciation). For example, if the generation in year 1 invested 3 units, then the generations in
years 2, 3 and 4 would receive a boost to current consumption by one unit each. By contrast,
generation 1 would not receive any boost to its consumption from its own investment.
Table A.1: Illustrative example of generational fairness and current consumption
Y e a r 123456
Country 2
Revenue 10 11 12 13 14 15
Spending 15 14 13 12 11 8.7
Investment 666600
Current consumption 9876 1 1 8 . 7
Total consumption
1 9 10 11 12 15 10.7
1 Sum of current consumption and consumption gained from previous generations’ investment.
A.24 In the above example it is assumed that the generation in year 1 invests 6 units, leaving 9
units for total consumption. The generation in year 2 spends 14 units but 6 units is on investment
as well. Hence the second generation consumes 8 units out of its own spending. In addition it
benefits from the first generation's investment which boosts current consumption by 2 units.
Hence the second generation has total consumption of 10 units. The third generation benefits
from investment made by generations 1 and 2 which boosts its consumption by 4 units in total,
and so on. Chart A.1 shows inter-generational fairness when looking at consumption rather than
spending. It can be seen that the above example yields a higher degree of inter-generational
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